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ABSTRACT 
The entire nation paid a high price militarily, politically, economically and socially 
during the twenty-six-year-old conflict in Sri Lanka. However, May 18, 2009, 
marked a significant milestone in the written history of Sri Lanka. The three-year-
long Humanitarian Operation conducted by the Sri Lankan Security Forces to 
liberate civilians from the cruel clutches of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) terrorists ended, assigning a total military defeat to the LTTE. As a nation, 
Sri Lanka is now facing the daunting task of a range of challenges in the post-war 
era. Above all, much effort is needed to heel the scars of the conflict and to build 
the Sri Lankan identity. Though the war is over, the remnants of the LTTE may 
pose a considerable security challenge. Amongst them are many surrendered 
combatants of the LTTE who are being rehabilitated and absorbed into the 
society. Sacred responsibility lies with the government in rehabilitating ex-
combatants is to ensure a long-term, results-oriented process. Considering the 
highly sensitive status quo of the issue at the aftermath of its conflict, the Sri 
Lankan government needs to contribute its share to rebuild the nation. Therefore, 
this thesis dwells on testing the benchmarks expected by the Sri Lankan 
government in carrying out this process and the outcome so far, in meeting the 
said contesting national requirement in comparison to other cases in the world. 
In this sense, the question arises as to how the programs of reintegration 
can be successful, and what potential problems could arise in the process of 
reintegration. Therefore, this thesis attempts to identify the questions of the Sri 
Lankan case in comparison to other cases, in understanding how de-
radicalization and re-integration evolved in these countries, and how they 
reached the benchmarks by overcoming weaknesses and lapses.  
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A. BACKGROUND TO THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT 
Sri Lanka has 2,500 years of a recorded history. The ethnic consistency of 
the island nation is comprised of a majority Sinhalese 72 %, Tamils 18% (12% 
Sri Lankan Tamils and 6% Indian Tamils), Muslims 7%, Malays 1% and others 
2%.  Sri Lanka is predominantly a Buddhist country; the mass affiliation to 
religion consists of Buddhists at 70%, Hindus at 16%, Islamists at 7%, Christians 
at 6%, and others at 1%, respectively.  Within modern history, the country was 
under successive Portuguese, Dutch and British colonization from 1505 until 
1948 when it gained independence from the British. The newly independent 
nation retained the name Ceylon until the 1972 constitution, which renamed it as 
Sri Lanka.1 The post-independent Sri Lanka had been very peaceful except for a 
few minor-scale communal riots. However, the situation changed dramatically 
after 1983, and Sri Lanka entered into the longest insurgency in South Asia, with 
an active conflict of 26 years of fighting.  
Administratively, Sri Lanka has 25 districts under 9 provinces. The 
Northern and Eastern provinces are predominantly the minority Tamil living 
provinces of Sri Lanka; the other seven provinces are dominated by the majority 
Sinhalese. The basic complaint of the minority Tamils was that they were not 
given due recognition by the majority Sinhalese governments of Sri Lanka, which 
they had enjoyed under the British rule. The British administration was very 
successful in their tactic and shattered the multi-ethnic foundation of the long-
standing unitary Sri Lanka through its divide-and-rule concept.2 Additionally, the 
British administration had re-ordered the ethnic composition of Sri Lanka. To 
address the scarcity of the labor force, they decided to bring Southern Indian 
                                            
1 Background Note: Sri Lanka (April 6, 2011), US Department of State: Bureau of South and 
Central Asian Affairs, retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm.  
2 Nira Wickramasinghe (2006), Sri Lanka in the modern age: a history of contested identities, 
University of Hawai’i Press, 27–33.  
 2 
Tamils to Sri Lanka; as a result, the Tamil representation in the Sri Lankan 
demographic scene rose to today’s 18% (increased by another 6%). 
The politicians’ shortsighted policies have been the basic factor behind the 
whole Sri Lankan issue, which dates backs to 1956 when the Sinhala language 
was made the only official language of Sri Lanka.3 Even though they were later 
rectified by the successive governments that also included the Tamil language as 
one of the official languages, the mistrust developed was never rectified. 
Supported by the opportunistic politics, the deprived and politicized Tamil 
youth—motivated by the radical militant leadership in the Northern and the 
Eastern Provinces—began to organize and claimed a separate country for 
Tamils called “Tamil Eelam.” The most prominent of these groups was the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The responsibility of creating the LTTE 
lies with Indira Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India. She did this because 
Sri Lanka adopted a U.S.-biased policy from 1977 onwards after opening its 
economy under President J. R. Jayawardena, when the India was an ally of 
Soviet Union.4  Gradually, the LTTE was developed under the blessings of Indira 
Gandhi by the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the state intelligence arm of 
India. When the LTTE was strong enough to operate independently, they went to 
the extent of the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India 
and Ranasinghe Premadasa, the former President of Sri Lanka. They pioneered 
the suicide bombing culture that terrorized the whole world and was instrumental 
in employing women and child soldiers on suicidal missions.  
They were the only terrorist organization in the world that had developed 
to reach the conventional level capabilities. They had their land forces, naval 
forces called the “Sea Tigers,” and the Air Force’s “Air Tigers,” with fewer light 
aircraft. July 1983, known as “Black July,” marked the formal beginning of civil 
                                            
3 J. N. Dixit (1998), Assignment Colombo (The Sabotage Begins), Konark Publishers Private 
Limited, 22–27. 
4 International Crisis Group, Asia Report no.°206 (June 23, 2011), “India and Sri Lanka after 
the LTTE,” 3. 
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war in Sri Lanka.5 The LTTE launched a deadly attack on the military in the 
North, killing 13 Sinhalese soldiers, which ultimately turned to into island-wide 
communal riots, fuelled by the opportunists and Sinhalese chauvinists. Some 
2,500 to 3,000 Tamils were estimated to have been killed, and many more fled 
Sinhalese-majority areas. This was the major outbreak of the conflict, and it has 
internationalized the Sri Lankan civil war.  
Many rounds of negotiations between the LTTE and the successive Sri 
Lankan governments throughout this period produced mixed results. However, 
towards the end, none of them was fruitful because the LTTE did not give up its 
demand and was not willing to accept anything short of a separate country. 
Therefore, all attempts made to resolve the conflict failed, as the LTTE did not 
accept any solution within the parameters of a unitary state. April 2006 was the 
beginning of the end of the LTTE. They captured the “Mavil-Aru” reservoir, one of 
the biggest water resources in the Eastern Province, and closed the sluice gates 
by disconnecting the water supply for thousands of acres of farming lands.  The 
government was left with no options and finally decided to launch the military 
operations against the LTTE.6 This was continued until May 2009, and was 
conducted systematically when compared with the early operations. On May 18, 
2009, the longest insurgency in the South Asia, the LTTE, was militarily defeated 
and three decades of terrorism in the island nation came to an end.  
With the end of the fighting—26 years after the government began its 
post-conflict development process in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri 
Lanka—the country now enjoys peace. After 26 years of conflict, Sri Lanka today 
has embarked on its future. Progress made after two years has produced mixed 
results. Some areas were highly successful and some areas are lacking the 
                                            
5 Asoka Bandarage (2009), The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka, Routledge, 104. 
6 The President’s address to the inaugural session of the Presidential Committee on 





potential. Out of 290,000 displaced refugees, the number of persons remaining in 
IDP camps is less than 7,000.7  Another most important area that the Sri Lankan 
government had to undertake was the responsibility of reintegrating the ex-LTTE 
combatants into the civilian society. As per the government’s records, out of 
11,600 ex-combatants who have been either surrendered or captured at the end 
of the battle, 10,600 of them have already completed their rehabilitation process 
and have reintegrated into the society.8   
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Ex combatants have to be reintegrated into mainstream civilian society 
because they are also a part of the country, and in accordance with human rights 
laws, they  have to be given with due recognition to enjoy the status of an 
average citizen of the country. In Sri Lanka, the ex combatants of LTTE 
(Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) are being demobilized, de-radicalized and 
reintegrated into the civilian society. However, a number of difficulties are being 
faced in terms of complete de-radicalization of these combatants because of 
some practical problems that need to be overcome. The question that arises in 
this process is: What are the lessons to be learned from the reintegration efforts 
carried out by other countries; and, how can the successful strategies used by 
other countries be applied to post-conflict Sri Lanka? Therefore, this is an 
important task because the combatants were rebels in their past lives and—once 
they were defeated—they cannot remain war prisoners forever.  
In this study, I made a comparative analysis of the reintegration of rebels 
as it took place in countries like Burundi, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.  
                                            
7 Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Sri Lanka, “Remaining number of IDPs 
dropped to 7000,” retrieved from http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20110829_03. 




This thesis determines whether their successful strategies can be applied to the 
Sri Lankan society, and how the current standards of reintegration in Sri Lanka 
are in parity with the benchmarks set by other countries. 
C. IMPORTANCE 
The phenomenon of reintegration and de-radicalization of former 
combatants of a particular terrorist or rebellion group becomes extremely 
important for any government when a civil war ends. When the LTTE in Sri Lanka 
were defeated after a conflict of almost three decades, eleven thousand ex-
combatants belonging to LTTE had to be de-radicalized and re-integrated into 
the society. The process faces many challenges, as the programs for 
reintegration takes a lot of effort and resources for its successful implementation 
and its goals to be achieved.  The reintegration of these combatants is a national 
security question because there are chances that they may revert to their old 
practices and loyalties, based on the success of the program. Therefore, there is 
a need for well-planned programs that can help these combatants reintegrate 
into the society. 
The phenomenon is not new; many other countries have already applied 
this reintegration successfully, while others have faced failure.  Considering the 
implications of the issue on states wherever such incidents have occurred, this 
research would make important contributions to security studies to understand 
the phenomenon of de-radicalization and re-integration in a holistic context. It 
would also be helpful to academics for reference in similar studies.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of literature pertaining to the reintegration and de-radicalization 
of former combatants of the LTTE reveals that the issue is quite complex. 
According to the analysis of Jeannie Annan and Ana Cutter Patel, one of the key 
aspects of the re-integration processes is to encourage social healing and to 
facilitate social acceptance for those who are re-integrating. According to the ex-
combatant focused model, most reintegration programs have been designed with 
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the prime objective of providing projects (mostly economic) in order to be self-
sustainable, while reducing chances of them returning to violence.9 
The model followed by Sri Lanka seems to be systematic. The President 
of Sri Lanka has expressed his views on the expected reintegration process to be 
initiated in Sri Lanka. Addressing the Presidential Committee on Development 
and Reconciliation, the President said, “After the successful conclusion of the 
‘Humanitarian Mission-1,’ to liberate civilians held hostage by a terrorist outfit, it’s 
time to launch ‘Humanitarian Mission-2,’ to get them back on track with their 
normal lives.”10 “The National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-
combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka” was initially developed by the Ministry 
of Disaster Management and Human Rights in Sri Lanka, and was aimed at 
achieving three basic goals:11 Firstly, to safeguard the human rights of ex-
combatants, including the responsibility to protect and assist them in accordance 
with the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the 
State's international obligations. Secondly, to contribute towards sustainable 
peace, reconciliation and social cohesion through the ex-combatant’s 
reintegration program.  And thirdly, to increase the employability of ex-
combatants, minimize their risk of socioeconomic marginalization and create 
opportunities for economic revitalization in post-war Sri Lanka.  
Due to anticipation and planning, the government’s mechanism to address 
the ex-combatants re-integration process, the “National Framework Proposal” 
went into action less than three months after the end of fighting between 
government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. A high-powered 
national steering committee has been formed to implement and monitor the 
                                            
9 Jeannie Annan and Ana Cutter Patel (2009), “Critical Issues and lessons in Social Re-
integration: Balancing Justice, Psychological Well Being, and Community Reconciliation” (CIDDR, 
May 2009), retrieved from http://cartagenaddr.org/literature_press/ART_21.pdf, 9–10. 
10 Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), 
National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lanka, 
retrieved from 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/@ifp_crisis/documents/publicatio
n/wcms_116478.pdf, inner cover page. 
11 Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), 1. 
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process, under the chairmanship of the Cabinet Minister in charge of Disaster 
Management and Human Rights. Representatives from the Ministry of Defense, 
Public Security, Law and Order, Ministry of Constitutional Affairs and National 
Integration and the Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare are 
also included. The International Labor Organization (ILO) provides the technical 
support and the financial assistance required for proper implementation of the 
National Framework Proposal.12 Based on the directions of the national steering 
committee, along with its guidelines, it has been decided to form three respective 
working groups, one for each of the three different areas of the process. 
Accordingly, the three working groups (similar to task forces) on reinsertion, 
social reintegration, and economic reintegration have been formed to monitor 
and develop their mechanisms under the master proposal. Members of the 
working groups consist of government officials, including permanent secretaries 
of subjected ministries, advisors of planning and policy implementation, and 
senior officials of the armed forces. It also includes representatives of other 
national and international organizations, including the United Nations agencies 
such as United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
International Labor Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
UN Resident Coordinator's Office in Sri Lanka, United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC).13 It is important to note that to make the process more 
meaningful, the National Steering Committee has taken the initiative to invite all 
relevant national and international actors to join the dialogue in finalizing its 
framework. The final outcome was that a consensus-based approach was 
agreed upon between all working groups and with the consultation of the 
representatives of the Tamil political parties, whose affiliations are with former 
LTTE combatants in terms of understanding their aspirations and views. 
                                            
12 Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), 2.  
13 Ibid., 3. 
 8 
Subsequent to military operations ending on May 19, 2009, the first-hand 
government directive, the “National framework proposal on reintegration of ex-
combatants,” was launched on July 30, 2009. Ex-combatants were sorted in to 
three categories, and Sri Lanka undertook the challenge of re-integration based 
on an approach driven by five core principles: similar levels of reintegration 
assistance irrespective of former affiliation, equity in gender treatment, demand-
driven approach, enabling ex-combatants to choose their reintegration 
preference to the greatest possible extent, linking ex-combatants with broader 
community-based economic recovery efforts and avoiding actions that may be 
perceived as privileging ex-combatants in relation to other war-affected 
communities.14 Further, this proposal discusses a homegrown approach, but with 
best international practices.15  
Accordingly, the National Framework Proposal of Sri Lanka has targeted 
four basic categories in their reintegration process. They are the ex-combatants 
of the LTTE who were captured and or arrested, the LTTE activists who 
surrendered prior to the conclusion of hostilities, members of non-LTTE 
paramilitary groups who were already normalized (most of them broke from the 
LTTE and are now working with the government), and the last category, host 
communities affected by the conflict.16  
While studying the multi-faceted nature of ex-combatants and giving a 
special categorization to them, G. Harris, N. Lewis and E. Dos Santos have 
suggests that the reintegrating of child soldiers must in accordance with the 
identified major issues of concern.17  Major General Shavendra Silva, the Deputy 
Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations, recently claimed 
                                            
14 Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), 7. 
15 Daily News (July 31, 2009), “National framework proposal on reintegration of ex-
combatants,” retrieved from http://www.dailynews.lk/2009/07/31/news20.asp.  
16 Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), 7. 
17 G. Harris, N. Lewis, and D. Santos (2003), “Recovery from Armed Conflict in Developing 




that the government’s present re-integration process for ex-combatants is 
unparalleled. He declared that the rehabilitation and re-integration of all former 
child combatants has successfully concluded.18 
It is important to discuss how Sri Lanka was organized to undertake the 
rehabilitation process according to a specific categorization. The new national 
framework proposal was put in place to function under the newly formed Bureau 
of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (BCGR), which comes under the 
purview of the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms in Sri Lanka. The 
inauguration of the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation dates 
back to September 12, 2006, and was established a few months after the 
government’s firm decision to defeat the LTTE organization militarily. The military 
operation to defeat LTTE lasted three years, beginning in April 2006. The Bureau 
of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (headed by a serving General 
Officer) has been fully empowered as the competent authority with a mandate to 
carry out the task of the reintegration process in post-war Sri Lanka. The mission 
of the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation is “to disengage, 
de-radicalize, rehabilitate and reintegrate the misguided men, women and 
children, who were radicalized by the protracted armed conflict, in to the 
community following a center and community based comprehensive rehabilitation 
process to be useful citizens and productive members to the country.”19 The 
bureau coordinates with all relevant local and international agencies over its 
funding and administration. The ex-combatants’ re-integration process was 
launched accordingly, based in “Rehabilitation Centers,” of which there were nine 
centers at the time of initial establishment. 
The bureau had to undertake the responsibility to rehabilitate a total of 
11,696 surrendered ex-LTTE combatants. There were nine rehabilitation camps, 
                                            
18 The Deputy Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations at the United 
Nations Security Council Open Debate on “Women, Peace and Security,” New York (October 26, 
2010), retrieved from http://www.priu.gov.lk. 
19 Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, “Vision and the Mission of the 
BCGR,” retrieved from http://bcgr.gov.lk/vision.php. 
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called Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centers (PARCs). They 
were initially established in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the island.20 
These centers were established around three major Tamil living areas and based 
on the policy of conducting rehabilitation for misled young men, women and 
children within their own community areas for their convenience. In the Eastern 
Province of Sri Lanka, three PARCs were established in the Thrikonamadu, 
Kandalkadu and Senapura areas. Covering the Southern part of the Northern 
Province, where a majority of Tamils are living, five PARCs were established in 
the areas of Poonthottam, Pompaimadu, Nellukkulam, Tamil Primary-Vavuniya 
and Maradamadu. Finally, covering the Northern part of the Northern Province, a 
PARC was established in the Tellippalai area.  
It is important to know what challenges the average rehabilitee—or 
“beneficiary” as they are more commonly referred to—faces in order to 
understand the expected role of the Bureau of the Commissioner General of 
Rehabilitation. According to Chamil Prasad, the challenges faced by ex-
combatants are multi-faceted, vary in each individual case and range over a 
huge spectrum. His analysis further identifies the nature of challenges faced by 
ex-combatants saying, “Most of them may be either hopeless or have no plan for 
their future. Recognition states also may fade away when compared to their stay 
with terrorist outfits, where they have to live with little earnings or no earnings, an 
inability to fulfill social responsibilities towards their families, difficulty receiving 
required medical assistance due to non-availability of facility or finance 
difficulties, an inability to continue their studies or acquire any kind of paper 
qualifications to face future challengers, uncertainties on their behaviors by 
                                            
20 Human Rights Unit: Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights (July 2009), 





military or social elements and non-availability of jobs or opportunities for 
livelihood activities”21. 
Rehabilitation programs conducted by the Bureau of the Commissioner 
General of Rehabilitation have targeted three categories of rehabilitees: child 
rehabilitees, adult female rehabilitees and adult male rehabilitees. According to 
the official website of the Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, 
a range of programs is being conducted for ex combatants according to their 
categorization. Rehabilitation programs for “child ex-combatants” includes: formal 
school education programs, vocational training programs, aesthetics and drama 
therapy programs, spiritual development programs, counseling and positive 
values cultivation programs, sports activities such as cricket, regional athletic 
meets, inter-school cricket and netball matches, sports meets, new year festivals, 
guiding and scouting, educational visits, friendship visits to other parts of the 
country, and innovative and creative literary child radio programs in collaboration 
with the Sri Lanka Broad Casting Cooperation (SLBC).22 
According to the bureau, the rehabilitation programs conducted for “adult 
female ex-combatants” include: classes for General Certificate of Education 
(Ordinary Level) and General Certificate of Education (Advanced Level) 
examinations, language training (Sinhala and English), typing shorthand for 
clerical work, diploma in nursery management, tailoring programs, sewing 
machine operator training programs with the help of the private sector apparel 
exporter industries, bridal dressing, hair dressing and make-up, yoga exercises 
and meditation programs, Buddhist meditation programs, aesthetics and drama 
therapy programs, lecturing and conducting training workshops in a variety of 
settings and special abilities in pre-marital, marital, family planning counseling 
                                            
21 Chamil Prasad, “Effective post conflict rehabilitation to prevent future conflicts in order to 
consolidate democracy through sustainable peace initiatives,” retrieved from 
http://www.liberalparty - order srilanka.org/liberalyouth/news-a-events/85-effective-post-conflict-
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22 Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, “Ongoing activity,” retrieved from 
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and career-related issues, computer basic knowledge (with help of private 
companies), computer aided drafting (CAD) and tri-dimensional drafting (3D), 
advance modeling and bridal dressing courses, cookery courses, spiritual 
development programs, counseling and positive values cultivation programs, 
sports activities (cricket, sports meets, festivals) and certificate programs on 
psychosocial counseling.23  
Of these programs, the General Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level) 
is the cutting edge of basic education, and the General Certificate of Education 
(Advanced Level) examination is the gateway to a university education, and is 
the prerequisite for entrance to other higher educational institutions. Because Sri 
Lanka is one of the top-ranking countries in the world for its literacy rate, and the 
fact that becoming qualified in education is extremely competitive in Sri Lanka, it 
is important that these ex-combatant female cadres have access to the 
educational process they missed for so many years due to their forceful 
conscription to the LTTE organization. Language education is the next most 
important program available.  The Sinhala language is the most widely spoken 
language in Sri Lanka—a language needed to bridge the long-standing gap 
between two major communities over ethnic disharmony. Learning the other 
community’s language will provide a solid foundation in the national reconciliation 
process, which has positive long-term effects. English is treated as a coordinated 
and international language in Sri Lanka, and the language in which most 
commercial activities are carried out. Furthermore, learning the English language 
will be an added advantage, as there are more opportunities in Sri Lanka for 
those who have a general understanding of it.  Training opportunities on the Juki 
sewing machine can be a golden opportunity. Today’s Sri Lanka’s economy 
depends on the export of ready-made garments, and it is the single largest 
source of income in Sri Lanka. 
                                            
23 Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, “Ongoing activity.” 
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Accordingly, the rehabilitation programs conducted for “adult male ex-
combatants” include: classes for General Certificate of Education (Ordinary 
Level) and General Certificate of Education (Advanced Level) examinations, 
language training (Sinhala and English), typing shorthand, plumbing, aluminum 
work, house wiring, Juki sewing machine operation, leather work, electrical work, 
carpentry, masonry, welding, heavy machinery training (dozers and earth 
movers), driving, tailoring programs, three-wheel and two-wheel repairing 
programs in collaboration with private sector companies, coconut cultivation, 
mushroom cultivation, use of chemical fertilizers, yoga exercises and meditation 
programs, Buddhist meditation programs, aesthetics and drama therapy 
programs, lecturing and conducting training workshops in variety of settings and 
special abilities in pre-marital, marital, family planning, counseling and career-
related issues, computer basic knowledge (with help of private sector 
companies), spiritual development programs, counseling and positive values 
cultivation programs, sports activities (cricket, sports meets, festivals), modeling 
courses, certificate programs on psychosocial counseling, outboard motorboat 
courses for fishing.24 As far as the male ex-combatant cadres who are expected 
to reintegrate to society are concerned, in addition to government examinations 
and language learning opportunities, there are many opportunities for them to be 
trained on an employability-driven profession or a trade. In addition, marriages 
amongst rehabilitated adult male and female ex-combatants have also been 
arranged. Friendship visits and goodwill exchange visits (such as sports or 
cultural programs) are organized to other parts of the country to build trust 
between two ethnic communities have also been included in order to increase 
harmony among two communities. 
In various regions of the world, terrorism and political violence increased 
after the 1990s because of the rapid proliferation of extreme rightwing factions. 
Equally crucial is the vehemence on the components and considerations that 
may assist to constrain militant groups to carry on their violent radical ideas to 
                                            
24 Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, “Ongoing activity.” 
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their decisions.25 According to the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, in Sri 
Lanka, weapon caches are continuously recovering, and some former LTTE 
members who were mingled with the general public are known to be at large. 
Further, they says that the position taken by the Tamil Diaspora are also not 
clear, after the total defeat of the LTTE, and poses a serious question because 
the stabilization of Tamil community should not be equated to the pacification of 
the Tamil population, the possibilities of generating further discontent.26 
However, the Sri Lankan bureaucrats have not yet made any decision over 
recruiting those ex-combatants into armed forces. Strength refers to the behavior 
changes, such as leaving the group, or changes in its role in the group. This does 
not necessarily imply a change in values or ideals, but requires the rejection of it 
to achieve change through violence. De-radicalization, however, involves a 
cognitive shift, a fundamental change in understanding.27 
Kees Kingma’s thoughts on reintegration efforts in Africa open another 
unique dimension of the Sri Lankan situation. According to the writer, most of 
African reintegration initiatives are backed with United Nations Peace Keeping 
Forces physical involvements, owing to their complexities beyond borders.28 
However, Sri Lanka dealt with a process where they achieved the peace-
defeating terrorism without any involvement of a third party, yet it depends on 
funding from United Nations agencies along with other donors. While paying his 
tribute to the volunteer experts and the International Organization for Migrants for 
their support, the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation in Sri Lanka has 
                                            
25 Tore Bjorgo (1995), Terror From the Extreme Right, New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 
49–53.  
26 USAID: Office of Transition Initiatives (2011), “Lessons Learned on Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration Programming-Annex K,” retrieved from 
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27 Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Ellie Hearne (2008), Beyond Terrorism: De-radicalization 
and Disengagement from Violent Extremism, International Peace Institute, New York: IPI 
Publications, 3–13.  
28 Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (2002), Recovering from Civil Conflict; 
Reconciliation, Peace and Development, New York: Routledge, 90–98.  
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requested international donor’s further assistance to meet desired results of the 
ongoing reintegration process.29 In a series of a practice notes, the International 
Alert has been able to identify some ground realities against those practical 
issues contesting the reintegration process in developing countries, owing to their 
weak economic status. Their main area of concern is the assurance on 
employment opportunities for rehabilitees, which is very much applicable in the 
Sri Lankan issue. The government has to realize that the extremist position was 
adopted by LTTE because of varying factors such as the discriminatory policies 
and practices against the Tamil population and the past government’s negligence 
towards the grievances of the Tamil population. Heading to a solution, they 
suggest that the private sector assistance is the key to counter the issue while 
developing vocational training and apprenticeship opportunities aiming at the 
same.30 
Currently, Sri Lanka is taking considerable steps to resolve the issue of 
the reintegration of the ex-combatants of LTTE. As per the official website, some 
of the programs are being carried out in order to rehabilitate the ex-combatants 
of LTTE so that they can be further reintegrated as per their respective 
categories.31 
Conducting leadership workshops, guidance on micro-business 
opportunities and self-employment opportunities are a few government-
recommended efforts. However, according to Chamil Prasad, some groups are 
stable enough to step into society on their own feet, thanks to what they gained 
                                            
29 Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Sri Lanka, “Rehabilitated 'Beneficiaries' 
Need Further Support, says CGR,” retrieved from 
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20110203_05. 
30 International Alert (2010), Cost of War; Sri Lanka Economy and Peace building, 1–10, 
retrieved from http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/library/CostsOfWar.pdf. 
31 Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation, “Programmes conducted for 
adults,” retrieved from http://www.bcgr.gov.lk/programs_adult.php. 
 16 
through these types of curriculums.32 Tsjeard Bouta focuses on reintegration 
over gender-based categorizations. One of Bouta’s observations is that the 
economic integration for female and male combatants is complicated because of 
the scarcity of resources that Sri Lanka needs to rethink.33 Muna Ndulo refers to 
the African situation and discusses the importance of the international 
contribution on rehabilitation processes.34 Stephan John Stedman, Donald 
Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens have made it clear: rather than suggesting a 
model to follow, they say that appropriate processes must be made according to 
national and local requirements.35  
In Burundi, the peace efforts were also characterized by an approach "in 
stages,” said Isaiah Nibizi, head of the National Commission for Demobilization 
and Reintegration. The peace agreement of 2000 committed especially political 
parties; the majority of insurgent groups, but not all, began to sign this 
agreement, but not until three years later. Successive socio-political crises have 
forced thousands of Burundians to flee their land to go into exile outside the 
country or to Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) sites. With the return of Peace, 
over 460,000 refugees exiled in 1993 were repatriated between January 2002 
and December 2008 with assistance from the Government of Burundi and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In 2008, some 
90,000 refugees were returned, mainly from Tanzania, a large proportion had 
been in exile since 1972. The Tanzanian government decided in 2007 to solve 
the problem of all refugees including those from 1972. They gave the choice to 
them—between repatriation and naturalization. Of the 220,000 refugees, about 
                                            
32 Prasad, “How to stay on Micro Businesses – Leadership Programme conducted for the 
Ex-Combatants,” retrieved from http://www.liberalparty-srilanka.org/liberalyouth/eu-parliament-
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33 Tsjeard Bouta (2005), “Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” 
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34 Muna Ndulo (2007), Security, Reconstruction and Reconciliation, New York: UCL Press, 
308. 
35 S. J. Stedman, D. Rothchild, and E. M. Cousens (2002), Ending Civil Wars: The 
Implementation of Peace Agreements, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 159.  
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55,000 opted for return. Following this, the international community initiated the 
return of refugees, which was expected to close later in the year 2009 to level of 
return, but will require several years to strengthen reintegration. 
The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process 
officially began in December 2004 with the goal of demobilizing 85,000 soldiers 
by 2008. In June 2005, about 10,000 men had been demobilized. It is hoped that 
at least some of the latest non-signatories agree to demobilize now, following the 
election victory of August 2005, the main former rebel group and the possible 
accession to the presidency of its leader, Pierre Nkurunziza.36 
The number of ex-combatants to be rehabilitated in Sri Lanka was 
comparatively less than in Burundi. The total number of 11,696 ex-LTTE 
combatants surrendered in Sri Lanka. Out of 11,696 cadres who surrendered, 
there are 8,900 former cadres who have been completed their reintegration 
process and have already reintegrated into society.  However, there is a backlog 
of another 2,800 ex-combatants who have yet to complete their reintegration 
process. Additionally, a group of ex-combatants is still under the process of 
interrogation and needs to be dealt with by judicial measures under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) due to the gravity and mass scale of crimes 
committed. Of them, 703 cadres are under detention orders to be interrogated 
further by the Terrorist Investigation Division (TID) of the Police Department.37 
The process is finished for most of the surrendered ex-combatants and the 
remainder of the ex-LTTE combatants is waiting to be rehabilitated and absorbed 
into society. 
In 2003, some deadly terrorist attacks took place in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. This sudden insurgency compelled the Saudi government to launch a 
                                            
36 Michael J. Gilligan (2011), “Reintegrating rebels into civilian life: Quasi experimental 
evidence from Burundi,” APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, 30–35. 
37 Bureau of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation in Sri Lanka, Official Information 
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varied campaign against the militants to counter terrorism.38 Saudi Arabia used a 
soft strategy to counter terrorism in its land, and used unconventional methods to 
curb the combatants, because coercion and threatening only worsened the 
conditions, as revealed in other countries such as Pakistan. 39 These soft 
measures to fight the ideological and intellectual rationale for violent extremism 
turned out to be quite successful when it came to the reintegration and de-
radicalization of the combatants. The main aim of the strategy was to involve and 
fight an ideology that the Saudi government considered deviant and corrupted 
from the real principles of Islam. The driving force for this soft advancement to 
curb radicalization and terrorism sprouted from the identification of violent 
extremism, which cannot be fought using traditional measures.40 
In 2004, Saudi Arabia launched its own process of de-radicalization using 
a soft strategy.  Under this version of the country, the militants in the Saudi jails 
were given classes, and those who opted for the classes received shorter 
sentences in the prison. The sessions were formulated to convince people with 
extremist mindsets that Islam is a religion of peace and that it does not condone 
the use of terror in any circumstances.41 
The strategy used by Saudi Arabia consisted of three programs: 
prevention, rehabilitation and post-release care (PRAC).  Though the program 
has been in operation for the past four years only, the strategy of the Saudi 
Arabian government to de-radicalize and rehabilitate the combatants yielded very 
positive results. To date, repetition and rates of re-arrest are extremely low at 
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approximately 1 to 2%.42 Programs of the same kind have been designed to 
demobilize the violence and extremism, and supporters of such programs are 
increasing the world over. Many countries, including Egypt, Yemen, Indonesia, 
Algeria, Malaysia and Jordan, have already established programs for 
reintegration, engagement and de-radicalization—just like the U.S. military has 
done in Iraq in Task Force 134. Thus far, the plan has fashioned results, with the 
Saudi government arrogating an 80–90 % rate of success.43 
The soft reintegration strategy was successful, primarily because of the 
understanding of the structure of the Saudi Arabian society. Saudis lead their 
lives in accordance with the teaching of their holy book, the Qur’an, which serves 
as a behavioral guide for the Muslims, and also serves the spiritual needs of the 
believers. Even if a Saudi is too liberal and secular, he will surely engage himself 
in the basic practices of Islam, which also includes the practicing of tolerance and 
moderation. However, conflicting sermons by radical priests, unclear and 
confusing interpretation of the holy Qur’an, and other factors such as the 
education system of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, often misleads the young 
mind toward adopting extremist and radical approaches.44 
After these efforts by the Bureau of the Commissioner General of 
Rehabilitation, it is worthwhile to discuss how the benefits for rehabilitees 
unfolded in Sri Lanka.  A total of 400 ex-combatant female cadres who 
completed training on the juki sewing machine were given juki machine operator 
appointments by a garment products exporting company, and they have based 
their living on the commercial capital.45 A total of 170 school-aged ex-LTTE 
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combatants, who were forcefully conscripted, appeared for the General 
Certificate of Education (Ordinary Level) examination in an examination center in 
Vavuniya, on December 13, 2010. Furthermore, about forty rehabilitees, who sat 
for the General Certificate of Education examination (Advanced Level) in August 
2010, qualified for university entrance for their higher education.46 A total of 30 
rehabilitated LTTE cadres were given employment opportunities in the public 
transportation system run by the government-owned depots of the Sri Lanka 
Transport Board.47 According to Chamil Prasad, some rehabilitees are 
potentially ready to step into society confidently with what they have gained 
through their rehabilitation process.48 In addition to what has been mentioned 
here, many other initiatives—such as self-employment opportunities and job 
opportunities in cooperation with private sector entrepreneurs—help to empower 
rehabilitees who have rejoined society. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to quantify the comparative triumph of the 
counseling agenda, particularly with only a number of years into the plan. 
Nevertheless, as per the statement of the Saudi confidences, only nine people 
have been rearrested for security law breakings after their discharge through the 
counseling program, corresponding to a backslider rank of 1–2%, whereas, in Sri 
Lanka, no such reports have yet been made. 
In 2002, Yemen was gripped by members of Al-Qaeda members, which is 
one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations of the world.49 The government 
of Yemen initiated a project to use negotiations as a means to change the ways 
of the distrusted militants who were arrested and held in the prisons of the state. 
The project was aimed at reintegration of these combatants into civilian life, and 
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this program received considerable international attention for its outstanding and 
bold step to use common references to the laws of Islam as a peaceful means for 
Yemen to influence the militants.  
The people who were detained in Yemen were involved in a project based 
on dialogue and were not among the prominent ideologues of any kind of 
movement related to Islam.  The detainees were kept under strict surveillance 
and their identities were never disclosed. The classical use of Islamic law was 
tried for the terrorists for the legitimacy of the state of Yemen in the eyes of the 
extremist Islamists. However, the principal trouble in this regard was that there 
was much unlimited evidence that the detainees were guilty of the crimes. 
Several of the detainees claimed that they never attempted to be involved 
in terrorist activities, but they had turned anti-government because of the 
unsuccessful strategies used by the government. In Yemen, the attempt to hold 
dialogues with the detainees failed, unlike in Saudi Arabia. The element of the 
dialogue seemed not only to have failed, but was also rendered to converting the 
detainees of terrorism to normal people. At the same time, the Yemeni 
counterterrorism strategy was greatly weakened because there was no credibility 
for the state party, which the dialogue committee was representing. 
However, the real implementation of the strategy was absorbed in 
arbitrary arrests, detentions for an indefinite period of time, torture and other 
violations of human rights. Moreover, it was not clear what charges were leveled 
against the people who were detained in prisons and what influences the 
dialogues had on the detained militants. The project ended in 2005 without 
considerable success, and it was proven that such strategies could be useful to 
counter terrorism by creating an environment for dialogue, but they have to take 
wider issues into account in order to ensure success.50 
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The de-radicalization and reintegration of ex-combatants is a crucial 
constituent of any government’s transitional strategy. This is because it is 
necessary for the enhancement of security across the country in advance of its 
resettlement. Regarding this, the early stages of the strategies pertaining to 
disarmament demobilization and reintegration programs will require the need to 
be quickly developed and enforced.51 Since the ex-combatants are a part of the 
society, the need for their reintegration into civilian life is of immense importance; 
these people have already been through a lot of social stress because of their 
rebellious attitude.  This is especially the case when the war has come to an end 
and the ex-combatants—men, women and their children—are looked down upon; 
society deems them unacceptable because of their former affiliation with a 
terrorist or rebellion organization.  
E. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
After a period of 26 years, the civil war in Sri Lanka, which took more than 
70,000 lives, is finally over. The military has arrogated complete control and 
triumph over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), removing the last 
remainders of the insurrection. However, stability in this region is still far off. This 
is because eliminating a terrorist organization will not magically bring an end to 
three decades of bad relations among the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese 
majority in Sri Lanka.  The president of Sri Lanka has expressed his views on the 
expected reintegration process to be initiated in Sri Lanka.52 
As previously noted Sri Lanka was in a tragic and savage armed conflict in 
which thousands of innocent civilians lost their lives. As a result, Sri Lanka faced 
enormous political, cultural and commercial disintegration as well as destruction 
to property.  In spite of the several efforts taken by consecutive governments in 
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the country, the LTTE or Tamil Tigers proved inexorable in their aim to establish 
a separate state in the North-East part of the country for the Tamil population. 
The LTTE used violence and repression against the people of the North-East and 
deprived them of their basic human rights. Humanitarian operations that were 
carried out in order to liberate the citizens who were held hostage by the LTTE 
were successfully completed in May 2009, following the demise of LTTE’s high 
command and the surrender of the remaining cells of LTTE. 
This study commenced at a time when no complete account of scholarly 
work specifically reported on the present re-integration efforts in Sri Lanka. The 
detainment of thousands of ex-combatants turned out to be a huge responsibility 
on the government, both politically as well as logistically, as in the case of many 
other countries.53 Many of these ex-combatants lived their entire lives during the 
course of war, and even as children, the LTTE conscripted the children together 
with the opportunity of having education and a normal family life.54 Since, the war 
was over, these ex-combatants de-radicalization and reintegration into civilian 
lives; so that the social, emotional, and economic needs of this susceptible group 
of people could be met. In order to curb the growing radicalization, interventions 
had been necessary so that the rebellions could be reintegrated into the society. 
In this regard, the European Council holds predominant significance to ensure 
that a deep cooperation exists between civil society and the concerned 
authorities toward the radicalization of the ex-combatants.55 
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A first-hand directive amplifying the policy to follow in reintegrating ex-
combatants was launched on July 30, 2009. Sri Lanka undertook the challenge 
based on the principles laid out in the “National framework proposal on 
reintegration of ex-combatants.” This proposal discusses a homegrown 
approach, but with best international practices.56 However, as of the 
Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (CGR), the most demanding challenge 
he faces is the permanent employment opportunities for the outgoing 
rehabilitees.57  
Though the war is over, the remnants of the LTTE may pose a 
considerable security challenge to the nation. Thousands of people have been 
displaced. Similar to the devastated infrastructure, the reconstruction process in 
post-conflict societies calls for immediate attention.58 Above all, much effort is 
needed to heal the scars of the conflict and to build the Sri Lankan identity. 
The ex-combatants of the LTTE are the focal point of concern, there are 
many other armed groups operating in the North and the East of the country; 
they also have to be de-radicalized and reintegrated, so as to make the process 
of reconstruction and development of these people more meaningful and 
comprehensive. For the purpose of bringing complete peace to the region, there 
is a dire need for understanding the best practices and procedures needed for a 
permanent de-radicalization of the ex-combatants so that they could lead a 
normal life.  
In this sense, the question arises as to how the programs of reintegration 
can be made successful and what are the potential problems that could be faced 
in the process of reintegration. In order to assess the study, I could consider the 
case study of Burundi, Saudi Arabia and Yemen to understand how de-
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radicalization and re-integration was carried out against terrorism in these 
regions, and how they reached the benchmarks by overcoming weaknesses and 
lapses.59 In this regard, the following hypotheses are developed for the study: 
Hypotheses 1: The process of reintegration in different countries take 
place as per the benchmarks set for the process of reintegration; therefore, the 
chances of success are considerably heightened.  
Hypotheses 2: Proper planning and implementation of strategies for re-
integration with standardized benchmarks can help the governments deal with 
the process of reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian society with 
considerable success, using soft strategies to de-radicalize the ex-combatants 
from an extremist ideological stance.  
Hypotheses 3: Proper planning covering all aspects of reintegration 
(economic, social, educational and individual) can help the ex-combatants 
achieve a sense of belongingness to the community and they would feel it is 
easier to blend into the civilian society. 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
I would compare the successful and failed cases, of reintegration which 
took place in different countries and draw lessons from them and make an 
assessment as to whether some of these lessons and their implications can be 
applied to the Sri Lankan case. 
This research was established and carried out by using the method of 
qualitative research.  The research was based on comparative case study 
analysis using secondary data. The data was extracted from various journals, 
articles and books. Secondary research depicts information assembled by 
literature, broadcast media, publications, and through open-source origins. In this 
research, I employ the case study methodology.  The case study research 
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methodology is widely used in the analysis of organizations by the various 
scientific disciplines, even though many scholars believe that the cases take us 
away from traditional science, because it tends to identify with the statistical 
analysis of large samples. The case study methodology is a comprehensive 
methodology that uses techniques such as observation, fact finding, document 
analysis, etc., and it can be both qualitative and quantitative data.  
G. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In this thesis, I study the concept of de-radicalization of ex-LTTE 
combatants in a holistic context. Among the five chapters, the first looks into the 
background of the Sri Lankan conflict, the research question, the importance of 
the study, the literature review and the problems and hypothesis. Chapters II, III 
and IV are dedicated to studying the cases of reintegration and de-radicalization 
in different regions of the world. The countries whose DDR campaigns were 
successful would be deemed appropriate to be applied on the Sri Lankan society 
as well, and the failed ones would be useful for learning not to make the same 
mistakes. For this, the case studies of other countries are discussed. 
Accordingly, in the second chapter, the re-integration process of Saudi Arabia is 
discussed as a case that was a success, as against the Sri Lankan re-integration 
process. In the other selected case studies, Burundi and Yemen are discussed in 
Chapters III and IV, respectively.  In comparison, these two cases have produced 
either the failed results or mixed results, as against that of the Sri Lankan re-
integration process. 
In the concluding chapter, the analysis and comparison of the selected 
case studies are conducted. The main focus of Chapter V would be the 
assessment of benchmarks that the Sri Lankan government can achieve in this 
regard by considering the case studies of other countries where the process of 
disarmament, de-radicalization and reintegration has already taken place.  
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Further, this chapter would declare the overall essence of the research, the 
lessons learned and the implications on Sri Lankan re-integration process in 
prescribing the measures for post-war Sri Lankan society. 
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II. THE SAUDI ARABIAN RE-INTEGRATION PROCESS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Saudi Arabian re-integration and rehabilitation program, along with its 
organizational structure, was started in 2004 and implemented by the Saudi 
Ministry of Interior. In terms of its organizational structure, the ministry introduced 
the rehabilitation program and established an advisory committee that had 
operated under four subcommittees. These subcommittees included the 
Psychological and Social subcommittee, the Religious subcommittee, the Media 
subcommittee, and the Security subcommittee. The number of participants 
rehabilitated and re-integrated so far is exceeding 3,000. At the initial stage, as 
many as 1,400 renounced their activities and re-integrated with their families 
after the proceedings of the counseling program. Another group of 1,000 had to 
undergo the phase-by-phase re-integration process. However, as per official 
records, only 35 re-arrests were reported by the end of 2007. Comparatively, this 
presents impressive datum in relevance to recidivism, which is as low as 1–
2%.60  
The rehabilitation campaign was successful; it started with 639 
participants and, with the passage of time, more than 3,000 men successfully 
completed the rehabilitation program, though not all were not hardcore terrorists. 
The specifics of the Saudi Arabian strategy were based on a decentralized 
campaign in order to fight terrorism and extremism, and to struggle against 
support of violent extremism. The specifics during the implementation were 
based more on conviction than compulsion, and included public information 
sharing and awareness, a re-education campaign through dialogue and 
communication, and soft mechanisms based on countering radicalism. 
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The level of resources in the re-integration program includes a number of 
agencies and governmental ministries that took part in the program. These 
include Ministries of Islamic Affairs, Da’wah, Endowment, Education and 
Guidance; Culture and Information; Higher Education and Social Affairs. 
However, as far as later reported rates of failures (recidivism) are concerned, in 
January 2009, at least eleven ex-Guantanamo Bay Prison detainees became 
terrorists again, after graduating from the Saudi DDR program. The strengths of 
the program are that they are well planned, well resourced, well financed and 
well implemented. The weaknesses of the program included recidivism of 11 
graduates back to al-Qaeda.61 
Like many countries of the world, Saudi Arabia also faced the problem of 
terrorism on its soil. The Saudi campaign of re-integrating extremists back into 
society has formed a significant and forward-looking part of Saudi Arabian 
society in dealing with the radicals. So far, the soft strategy has proven fruitful for 
the Kingdom in re-integrating extremists back into society. Owing to the 
sensitivity of the issue, Saudi Arabia was strongly compelled and committed to 
addressing de-radicalization and re-integration of its radicals into mainstream 
civil society.  
As a result of the September 11, 2001, when New York’s Twin Towers 
were attacked by Muslim extremists, about 3,000 civilians lost their lives. After 
the attacks, some 19 hijackers were identified; they belonged to the Islamic 
terrorist organization, al-Qaeda. Out of the 19 terrorists, 15 of the attackers were 
Saudi Arabian Nationals, including the mastermind behind the attacks, and the 
leader of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. Because he could not be arrested 
immediately after the attacks; he had considerable influence over Islamic 
extremists across the globe. In May 2003, al-Qaeda ran a violent campaign in the 
Arabian Peninsula, resulting in 300 casualties over an 18-month period.   
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The Saudi Arabian bombings were carried out in May 2003 by active al-Qaeda 
member Yousuf Al- Ayiri. Many of the militants involved in these activities fought 
to death, and some even committed suicide rather than be captured by law 
enforcement authorities.  
To this end, the Saudi government got involved with other Islamic states 
as well as some top-level, Western-educated Saudi scholars with suitable 
expertise to design a strategy.62 The program was coordinated and funded by 
the Interior Ministry of Saudi Arabia, which was the primary governmental agency 
responsible for ensuring public security in the Kingdom.  The main objective of 
the Kingdom's efforts was to strengthen the legitimacy of the existing system 
while countering radicalism and eliminating any further opportunities for 
terrorism. In this regard, the Saudi government had a lot of pressure from the 
international community to look into this serious social malaise of Islamic 
extremism, which was proliferating among Muslims from different parts of the 
world and was a deadly, emerging threat for the non-Muslim community across 
the globe.  The Saudi government firmly believed that this matter was sensitive 
and could not be handled through the actions of traditional security measures 
alone.  Further, the structure and specifics of the Saudi soft campaign to fight 
terrorism and its progress were aimed to dispel the intellectual support of Islamic 
extremism. 
B. BACKGROUND TO THE TERRORISM PROBLEM IN SAUDI ARABIA 
The tragic incident of September 11, 2001, created a furor among people 
across the globe to fight against terrorism and extremism. More importantly, the 
entire Middle East was shocked to know that 15 out of 19 hijackers involved in 
the 9/11 attacks were Saudi Arabian citizens.  
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What was more shocking was that the mastermind behind the worst terrorist 
attack in the history of United States was Osama bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian 
citizen, born and raised in a rich Saudi Arabian family. Because of this, some 
reports even suggested that Saudi Arabia had been financing terrorist groups like 
al-Qaeda. However, the Saudi Arabian government denies such allegations.  
This incident put a question mark over the rise of extremism among the 
Muslim world. By this time, anti-American sentiments had developed among 
particular factions of Muslims, because of the American agenda of supporting 
Israel, United States support to dictatorial Arab regimes and the presence of 
American forces in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa 
against American troops who had come to Saudi Arabia for a conducted 
operation called Southern Watch.  This enraged the Muslims, and they decided 
to wage war against non-Muslims, considering all of them to be “infidels” largely 
due to their misinterpretation of Islamic teachings. America was particularly 
unpopular among the Muslims because of its hegemonic stance and the way it 
periodically exploited its activities in many countries of the world.  
The situation was further aggravated with the succeeding events of 9/11 
as United States forces invaded Muslim countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan 
in the name of its “Global War on Terror (GWOT).” This background induced 
more hatred and extremist thinking, in the minds of Muslims, to go to war against 
the United States; a large number of radical Islamists emerged following the 
footsteps of Osama bin Laden. Saudi Arabia’s efforts to deal with radicals were 
triggered by the realization that the Kingdom was facing a threat that stemmed 
not only from the activities of Osama bin Laden—who was a well-known al-
Qaeda leader and the son of a Saudi Arabian construction tycoon—but also that 
15 of the 19 hijackers in the 9/11 attacks were Saudi Arabian nationals. 
Moreover, in May 2003, al-Qaeda launched an 18-month campaign on the 
Arabian Peninsula when some 300 casualties occurred. The victims of these 
terrorist attacks included some 90 civilians, some Western expatriates, 40 police 
officials, and 150 of al-Qaeda’s own militants.  
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Another threat that the Saudi Arabian government faced was the 
realization of growing radicalization among many young Saudi men to the point 
that they were ready to embrace death or the culture of nihilism, which is a 
radical philosophy that advocates demolition of the social system for its own 
sake. This threat was difficult to quantify and address, but the Saudi government 
carried out considerable research on the phenomenon of radicalization and 
extremism to enforce programs pertaining to de-radicalization and counter-
radicalization.  The Saudi Arabian government acknowledged that, because it is 
the keeper of the two Holiest places for Muslims across the globe (the places 
being Mecca and Madina), it is the duty of the Kingdom to exhibit some 
impressive leadership in changing the perceptions of the Islamic world.  This 
includes the label of extremism, which has come to be recognized as 
synonymous with Jihad in Islam. 
C. THE SAUDI ARABIAN RE-INTEGRATION PROGRAM 2004 
In 2003, following this extremist eruption, deadly terrorist attacks took 
place in Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia established 
a widely arrayed counterterrorism campaign, centered on an unconventional soft 
scheme. The soft scheme is designed to fight the ideological and intellectual 
justifications for fierce extremism.  The chief objective behind the soft strategy is 
to engage and fight ideology, which corrupted interpretations of Islam that 
deviated from the official Saudi interpretation of Islam. The drift toward this soft 
strategy largely came from the recognition that traditional methods of security 
and coercion are not enough to combat violent extremism.63 
The soft strategy adopted by the kingdom is composed of three programs 
aimed at: prevention, rehabilitation and the post-release care of detainees—
known as the PRAC Strategy.  
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Having been in effect for the past eight years, the Kingdom’s soft strategy has 
produced some appreciable results, particularly in terms of counter-radicalization 
and rehabilitation.   
First, to date, according to the Saudi government, a very small number of 
released Saudi Guantanamo returnees have reoffended.64 However, the rates of 
recidivism can be deceptive. This is because statistics released by government 
can be imprecise, reflecting the limited knowledge of the intelligence services 
and monitoring mechanisms. The Saudi de-radicalization program, for instance, 
was conceived as a completely successful project; the Saudis had been 
presenting a very rosy picture to the international world, until, in the end of 2009, 
11 graduates from the Saudi reintegration program recidivated to terrorist 
activities. Moreover, most de-radicalization programs are relatively new, so they 
cannot be assessed for a lasting behavioral impact.65 Second, the results 
generated by the Saudi re-integration program have led to considerable interest 
in exploring alternatives to traditional hard security measures. Third, the Saudi 
Arabian re-integration program has provided an example for other countries to 
follow. And finally, the extremist face of Islam is revealed to be a deviant version 
of Islam from that of the Saudi Arabian official Islamic interpretation, and a 
deviation from the true meaning of Islam.66 
Similar programs have been formulated to demobilize fierce extremists 
and anyone who supports such an ideology. Demobilization campaigns are 
increasingly popular, with many other countries adopting similar strategies to 
combat terrorism and de-radicalization in their countries. For instance, the United 
States military Task Force 134 in Iraq, and government-initiated programs in 
countries such as Algeria, Singapore, Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, Malaysia and 
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Indonesia have all founded engagement and rehabilitation programs in their 
countries in the wake of increasing radical thinking among particular segments of 
the masses.  As such, the relevancy of the Kingdom’s soft strategy and the 
efforts of counter-radicalization in general have increased since the start of the 
struggle against radicalization and Islamic extremism.67 
As previously mentioned, the Saudi strategy consists of three interrelated 
programs aimed at prevention, rehabilitation and recovery after the release of 
detainees.  Since its application eight years ago, the results of Saudi strategy 
have shown positive results, particularly in rehabilitation and the fight against 
extremism. As a result, understanding the Saudi strategy and its operations in 
combating extremism has become a hot topic within the Muslim world as well as 
in other regions with problems of terrorism.68 
Prior to analyzing the three components of the Prevention, Rehabilitation, 
After Care (or PRAC) Strategy, it is important to note that the basic organization 
and structure of the policy lies with the Saudi government. The program was 
designed and funded by the Saudi Arabian interior ministry, which is the principal 
government agency responsible for ensuring public security in the Kingdom.69 
The ministry is responsible for overseeing most of the programs that have been 
designed to deal with the Guantanamo returnees and any terrorist-minded 
detainees in general. The ministry also oversees a number of other areas related 
to safety and security; these include counterterrorism in the country, domestic 
security, investigations pertaining to criminal activities in the country, civil 
defense, protection of the infrastructure, counterespionage, administration of the 
prisons and border and passport security.   
The ministry is headed by Prince Naif bin Abdul-Aziz, a brother of the late 
King Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz. The counterterrorism strategy of the Kingdom is 
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headed by Prince Muhammad bin Naif, who is the assistant minister in the Saudi 
Interior Ministry for Security Affairs.70 The ministry also oversees the PRAC 
program. Currently, Nayef bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, crowned as the First Deputy 
Prime Minister, holds the office of the Saudi Arabian Interior Minister.71 The 
ministry’s office has organized several components of the counterterrorism 
strategy for detainees and terrorists. The Advisory Committee, for example, is 
responsible for the implementation of the counseling program in the prisons and 
carrying out dialogues and debates between prisoners and religious scholars to 
rectify their misconceptions.  
This program was designed for Guantanamo Bay returnees, and they 
were given a free choice to opt for the rehabilitation program. The Saudi 
government decided not to impose the program on the detainees; hence, the 
strategy was called soft strategy. The detainees were invited to join the 
rehabilitation program regardless of their individual offenses. However, those 
who had committed the worst crimes were also invited to the rehabilitation 
program, but the government decided to retain them for a longer period of time 
for monitoring their behavior and judging their intentions. 
The ministry also oversees the social needs and the rehabilitation 
program’s conditions, the participants’ conditions and the conditions of the 
families of the participants who are requested by the Saudi government to extend 
maximum cooperation in helping their detained family members as they try to 
reintegrate into the civilian society while the members are still incarcerated.72 The 
office ensures that everything necessary is available to avoid delays and 
discrepancies in the program. The ministry also considers the condition of 
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extended family member support by providing financial and social support to 
retain a respectable position in the society, despite their family member being 
held for terrorist activities.73 The ministry extends financial support and other 
assistance, and also makes sure that no other members of the detainees’ 
families are engaged in radicalized thinking because of the hardships they have 
had to suffer as a result of their family member’s incarceration.  
The ministry’s offices also have close coordination with the activities of the 
anti-radicalization section, which is composed of some Western-educated74 
psychologists, social scientists, doctors, psychiatrists as well as statisticians who 
have the ability to understand the reasons and implications of terrorism in a 
broad way.75 The number of people hired and trained to work on the strategy 
demonstrates the commitment of the Saudi government towards eradicating 
terrorism from Saudi Arabian soil and the hearts and minds of the people. It also 
aims to bring about a positive change within the lives of the ex-terrorists and 
society as a whole, as well as re-establishing the tarnished image of Islam in the 
eyes of the world. The office operates an ideological security unit (ISU) that is 
responsible for the promotion of disseminating sound religious information and 
schemes to undersell extremist beliefs and attitudes.76 Moreover, the ministry 
office works with King Fahd’s Security College as well as the Prince Nayef’s Arab 
Academy for Security Studies in the creation of some special curriculum and 
vocational training for public security officers. With such specialization and 
expertise, the core aim of the PRAC strategy features a campaign, which is 
decentralized to fight against terrorism in any form, eradicate religious 
extremism, and ameliorate the condition of ex-terrorists. Other agencies and 
ministries, which closely work with the ministry, include Endowment, Da’wah and 
                                            
73 G. Kepel (2006), Jihad: the trail of political Islam, London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 218.  
74 B. Fishman and A. Moghadam (2011), Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Organizational, 
Strategic, Ideological Fissures, New York: Routledge, 107–109.  
75 Boucek (2008), Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy, 9–22. 
76 Boucek (2008), Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy, 9–22. 
 38 
Guidance; Higher Education, Islamic Affairs, Information and Ministry for Cultural 
Affairs, Ministry for Social Affairs and the Ministry for Labor Welfare, etc.77 
1. Implementation of the Saudi Arabian Re-integration Program 
The Saudi campaign of re-integrating extremists into society has formed a 
significant and forward-looking aspect of the Saudi Arabian society to deal with 
radicals. So far, the soft strategy has turned out to be fruitful for the Kingdom in 
some way. This is because Saudi Arabia had been facing relatively small 
terrorism-related problems, compared to other Arab countries like Yemen and 
Iraq. The program was used for people who were not hardcore terrorists 
themselves, but extended support to terrorist activities. To date, the Kingdom has 
been engaged in making major arrests throughout the country; therefore, one 
cannot say that the problem was 100% fruitful for the Kingdom, but it helped to 
alleviate the problem of hardcore terrorism. 
The Saudi government also strives to monitor all extremist websites, 
which are often a prime source of motivating young Saudi men to take up jihad 
and adopt violence and extremism in the name of Islam. Nonetheless, the most 
visible expression of the Saudi government in response to radicalization is the 
well-resourced rehabilitation and de-radicalization program, which began in 2004. 
This program was planned to offer opportunities for detained extremists, who are 
to be re-integrated into the Saudi society.  
First, the program aimed to cover some 100 Saudi nationals who were 
imprisoned by the United States in Guantanamo Bay Prison, Cuba, and were 
released back to Saudi Arabian custody. Under this program, the radical 
detainees can volunteer to be re-integrated into society via a rehabilitation 
facility.  Several such facilities have been built throughout the Kingdom, including 
the cities of Riyadh, Jeddah, Damma, Abha, and Qassim.  These are called Care 
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Rehabilitation Centers.78 These well-built houses have sufficient supporting staff 
and can accommodate around 3,000 people. The starting point for rehabilitation 
is the precondition that those people who have fallen prey to the influence of the 
radicals are themselves victims, and therefore, they should be helped.   
Individuals working toward rehabilitation are given a two-month residential 
stay, and they undergo a range of programs, encompassing social and economic 
issues, indoctrination of religious beliefs, and different forms of therapy including 
sports and art. The victims given a psychological evaluation and their families are 
allowed to visit them. There are various activities and classes in which victims 
have to participate, and upon completion of the program, individuals are re-
integrated into society.  The families of the victims are also provided with 
financial support from the Saudi state, and they get financial aid even if they have 
their own consent to enter the rehabilitation program.  Once a participant has 
completed the program successfully, the Saudi government grants financial 
assistance, a house, a car, a job, and, in some cases, the form detainees are 
helped with finding a wife so that they can start a family and move toward 
forward instead of returning to a life in terrorism.79 
The participants are re-integrated into society after receiving a guarantee 
from their families and tribal relations,80 and they agree to an informal 24/7 
surveillance capability that offers the state confidence against the danger of 
recidivating into terrorist activities.  Once released, these ex-combatants are 
indefinitely banned from traveling abroad.  While some detainees take advantage 
of the rehabilitation program, most hardcore jihadists prefer to remain in high-
security prisons, rather than get involved in a re-integration program, because 
they consider the Saudi government to be a renegade regime.  
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The Saudi Arabian re-integration program was a re-education camp for 
the former detainees of Guantanamo Bay Prison.  A special re-integration and 
rehabilitation program was designed specifically for former detainees of Saudi 
Arabian nationality upon their return home, which aimed to indoctrinate the 
detainees against violent jihad and the use of terror to enforce their ideologies on 
others.  The Saudi government not only provided them with reeducation, but also 
with a government stipend, lodging, and food. When the outside world saw this, 
they misinterpreted the program. They took the entire re-integration process as 
an attempt by the Saudi government to create a breeding ground for more 
terrorists by providing the Guantanamo returnees with such VIP (Very Important 
Persons) treatments.  However, the soft re-integration strategy used by the Saudi 
government worked wonders for the former detainees; the Saudi Arabian re-
integration process is now considered one of the prime examples of successful 
ex-combatant re-integration into civilian society.81 However, the facilities provided 
to the ex-combatants require considerable resources, and not every country can 
provide similar efforts or capacities.  
2. Outcome of the Saudi Arabian Re-integration Program 
This success was achieved because the Saudi government actually 
handled the terrorists like human beings, understood their emotional and human 
needs and then designed the strategy for their rehabilitation, accordingly. The 
terrorists were not viewed as a problem and were not subjected to alien 
treatments, which often makes them rebel even more and resort to terrorist 
means once again to achieve their objectives. Critics of the program were 
concerned that such an arrangement would boost the morale of terrorists and 
would put them back on the streets. 
According to the defense officials of Guantanamo Bay Prison, around 480 
detainees were released from the prison and out of them, about 30 have taken 
up terrorist activities once again. According to a terrorist analyst, Steve Emerson, 
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the Saudi Arabian program for the rehabilitation of the detainees was extremely 
intriguing because it served as an alternative to holding the detainees at the 
Guantanamo Bay Prison for an indefinite period of time—and often subjecting the 
detainees to inhuman treatments.  A variety of factors resulted in the success of 
the Saudi Arabian re-integration process, including the social structure of the 
country, as well as the geographical structure.82 For instance, Saudi Arabian 
society is based on a tribal system, and whenever there is a re-integration 
process, there is hope for surveillance to be carried out once the former 
combatants are re-integrated into society. Similarly, geography is important; for 
instance, in Pakistan, Afghanistan and in Algeria, the mountainous terrain serves 
as a safe haven for terrorists to hide from the authorities, and their arrests 
become a problem.  Furthermore, their activities, plotting and planning cannot be 
monitored.  Another reason is that Saudi Arabia has a rich government and the 
re-integration program was well funded by the government to achieve success.   
Moreover, about 100 Saudis were held up in Guantanamo Bay Prison, as 
compared to other countries with a considerable number of citizens detained in 
the prison. For other countries such as Algeria, Yemen, Burundi, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, Sierra Leone, etc., it would have been difficult for such a re-integration 
program to yield success because of the kind of financial funding required in 
making such programs successful. Moreover, it would be much more difficult for 
other countries to manage and monitor the ex-combatants once they have been 
re-integrated into the society because the societal structure, law and order 
situation, geographical terrain, political stability and religious hold vary greatly 
from country to country. One strategy that may work in one region cannot be 
guaranteed to work in another region. Therefore, there is a need to design re-
integration strategies by keeping some of the basic success elements in mind, 
but also incorporating the religious, societal, cultural and other values of each 
distinct society. For instance, Saudi Arabia is a close-knit society because of the 
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extensive tribal system in the country and strong familial system, by which the 
society becomes less centrifugal, making it easier to monitor the activities of an 
individual. The Saudi re-integration process revealed that it depended heavily on 
societal resources and the familial structure of society that is apparently lacking 
in countries such as Yemen, Sri Lanka, and Burundi.83 
In the Saudi Arabian re-integration process, the detainees of Guantanamo 
Bay Prison, upon their return to their home country, were first allowed to reunite 
with their families for a period of one week, after which they were required to 
enter a rehabilitation program, which extended over a period of six weeks. The 
program aimed basically at the “correction of their ideas,” instead of merely 
imposing new ideas on their ideological mindset about the concept of Jihad in 
Islam and fighting non-Muslims. The program also aimed to remove the al-Qaeda 
imposed theology from the minds of the ex-combatants by making them interact 
with some of the well-known Islamic scholars in a one-on-one discussion. The 
Saudi government gave the combatants a chance to engage in an interactive 
question and answer session, which helped them clear their concepts about 
Jihad in the light of scholarly advice. The program also aimed to ameliorate the 
image of the Saudi government, tarnished by the radical theology of al-Qaeda, 
which considered the Saudi government to be a string puppet of the West, 
especially the United States. This aroused negative and rebellious sentiments in 
the hearts of the people.84 
After completing the rehabilitation program, the former detainees began 
the second stage of the rehabilitation program at another facility. This 
rehabilitation center was specifically designed and built for former detainees. The 
rehabilitation center was equipped with volleyball courts, a swimming pool, table 
tennis, video gaming facilities, etc. 
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The center was no less than a luxurious resort and the detainees were 
treated like outpatients. In the center, the detainees were given vocational 
training, classes on religious concepts with one-on-one sessions, and they were 
counseled by psychologists to deal with depression and overcoming the stigma 
of being associated with a terrorist organization. Some of the detainees had had 
problems adjusting psychologically after lengthy captivities, so they were 
provided separate counseling classes to overcome their levels of stress. The 
detainees were in no way held like prisoners, as they were allowed to spend 
occasional nights with their families and during the Muslim holy month of 
Ramadan, the detainees were given a week’s holiday to spend with their families 
and relatives. Thus, it is evident that strong family units in Saudi Arabian society 
helped the detainees to re-integrate into society within a short span of time, and 
with considerable success.85 
In some societies, where the familial structure is not so close-knit, 
problems arise because of the force of individualism that greatly affects and 
undermines the ability of someone who has been involved in terrorist activities to 
rely on relatives or receive good treatment. They are usually treated as outcasts 
and relatives generally avoid being associated with kin who have been labeled as 
a criminal and are usually viewed as a symbol of shame for the family.  
Thus, it becomes difficult for ex-combatants to re-integrate as easily into 
society because the societal structure is generally uninviting and the stigma of 
being an outcast keeps haunting them, which can result in depression and the 
feeling of being dejected, sometimes compelling ex-combatants to resort back to 
their terrorist lives. Since the Saudi Arabian society has a definite set of norms 
and values, and the private space for individuals is small in comparison with 
other societies, it is difficult in Saudi Arabia for individuals to deviate from the 
prevalent norms. If someone tries to maintain dissenting viewpoints, he or she is 
discouraged by society, and thus, most people prefer to conform to the dominant 
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averages of the society. For a person who is living in a non-conformist society, it 
is easier for him to act awkwardly than it is for someone who lives in a conformist 
tribal society.86 
Another added advantage for the Saudi Arabian re-integration success 
was the religious aspect of the program. Saudi Arabian society is a theocratic 
society, whereas most other countries, with unsuccessful re-integration, have 
become secular republics. For example, Yemen also has a sizeable Muslim 
population, but it is largely a secular state and does not have a societal structure 
like that of the Saudi Arabia. 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the rehabilitation program was not superficial 
and was deeply inculcated into the hearts and minds of the former Guantanamo 
Bay Prison detainees.87 A good example of this is the case of an ex-
Guantanamo detainee, Jabr al-Faifi, who volunteered to enter the Saudi Arabian 
rehabilitation program in 1996.88 During his rehabilitation program, he deviated 
and escaped the rehabilitation center to Yemen and rejoined al-Qaeda.  
However, he was quite influenced by the rehabilitation program, as he himself felt 
that his heart had changed; consequently, he did not feel comfortable with the 
terrorist life again.  
Thus, he contacted the rehabilitation center himself and he returned to 
become a Saudi once again. There were reports that this man helped the Saudi 
authorities with confidential information on terrorist activities and provided vital 
information about the plotting of a Yemen cargo bomb that had been mailed to 
the United States to an address of a Jewish person. The Saudi media well 
publicized the return of al-Faifi to Saudi Arabian society—and another al-Qaeda 
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member who had returned to Saudi Arabia with him—as a success of the re-
integration and rehabilitation program and its use of soft strategies against the 
former combatants.89 
However, while the Saudi government met with the recidivism of released 
and re-integrated 11 participants from the rehabilitation and re-integration 
program, the media criticized the Saudi government for babysitting the 
terrorists.90 There have been criticisms of the program wherein the participants of 
the program are made to meet with a religious scholar to engage in a one-on-one 
discussion, as previously mentioned, and debate on different interpretations of 
Islam. If the ex-combatants are seen as conforming to the standards of the 
rehabilitation program and show deflection in their previous opinions, they are 
persuaded further, and they graduate from the program.  
In 2002, when Guantanamo Bay Prison opened, among the foreign 
nationals who were detained on charges of terrorism, 136 of them had been 
identified as Saudi nationals. According to the United States officials at 
Guantanamo Bay Prison, three of the Saudis committed suicide in prison, while 
13 of them were held in prison for long periods of time. The other detainees were 
returned to the Saudi government in small groups over several years. As against 
the hostile and inhumane treatment that was given to the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay Prison, when the Saudis returned home, they received 
treatment that they had never expected. 
In 2009, the Saudi Arabian government identified and published a list of 
the 85 most wanted terrorists stationed outside of Saudi Arabian territory. Seven 
of the listed terrorists had served their sentence in Guantanamo Bay Prison and 
had been re-integrated into Saudi Arabian civilian society after undertaking the 
Saudi Arabian rehabilitation program. These seven are suspected to be hiding 
somewhere in Yemen. While the number seven may seem to be insignificant 
                                            
89 Y. Yehoshua (2006), Reeducation of Extremists in Saudi Arabia, The Middle East Media 
Research Institute (MEMRI), retrieved from http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1582.htm.  
90 Ibid. 
 46 
among 85, these were no ordinary terrorists; they were people who had their 
minds full of hatred and had the potential and past to kill—even with a suicide 
bomb. The reported mindset in these terrorists spread alarm among the critics of 
the effectiveness of the Saudi Arabian re-integration program.91 
Although some have criticized the Saudi Arabian government’s soft 
approach in countering extremist ideology in baiting the ex-terrorists with 
financial support, jobs, lodgings, meals and even organizing and arranging a 
wedding after completing the rehabilitation program, it has shown a way towards 
the countries that are continuously suffering due to the effects of the extremism. 
To many, the whole idea was terrifying, thinking the program serves as a 
breeding ground for terrorists. According to them, the rehabilitation program 
cannot guarantee the elimination of deeply rooted terrorist ideology, and there 
are chances of recidivism. Scholars who oppose this argue that not only Saudi 
Arabia, but other states as well, will have greater difficulties in countering the 
extremist ideological appeal of al-Qaeda and other organizations without finding 
collective and permanent solutions to major regional conflicts.92 However, the 
rate of success of the Saudi Arabian re-integration program has succeeded, and 
its appreciation outweighs its criticism. 
3. Summary of the Saudi Arabian Re-integration Process  
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the reintegration process was considered a 
success for several reasons. The most important reason for the success of Saudi 
Arabia, and in the case of soft strategy, apertures used to address the most 
dangerous terrorists were v well planned and executed. This is because Saudi 
Arabia had the advantage of its wealth to be utilized for the program. The state of 
Saudi Arabia did not depend on foreign aid money to carry out its program of re- 
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integration. The Saudi state fully took the responsibility of the program, under the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and made a well-developed plan for the re-integration 
of ex-terrorists. 
For the purposes of this program, the government of Saudi Arabia used 
the soft strategy in which religious scholars, Western-trained Saudi psychologists 
and other trained foreign experts on terrorism are hired to develop a plan for the 
success of countering terrorist ideology. Under the strategy of PRAC in Saudi 
Arabia, the government has built well-resourced and well-equipped rehabilitation 
centers for prisoners at Guantanamo, and has lectured on religion to guide them 
to a positive interpretation of Islam and help put an end to a biased interpretation 
of Islam. 
Under this program, the detainees were not only exposed to motivational 
speeches, they were taught various sports and skills in order to provide some 
entertainment, which proved valuable for the health of the mind and body. The 
government’s rich material assistance to the families of prisoners, in turn, 
provided the most support for the government to curb recidivism. However, the 
rates of recidivism occurred in the year 2009, and it raised a question mark on 
the constant claim of success that the Saudi government had been pledging. 
Nonetheless, relatively speaking, the Saudi Arabian re-integration strategy had 
some reasons to be a considerable success. 
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III. THE BURUNDIAN REINTEGRATION PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Burundian disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR) 
program began in December 2004. The government administrative body that 
implemented the Burundian reintegration process was the National Commission 
for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). In terms of its 
organizational structure, the commission (NCDDR) was supported by an 
Executive Secretariat (ES), who was responsible for taking care of the technical 
sides of planning, implementation and supervision of the overall program and 
ensuring proper coordination with external resources and program partners. The 
functions of the Executive Secretariat (ES) were further decentralized and 
supported by Provincial Program Offices (PPOs) that were established in the 
selective localities of the country, considering the convenience of the ex-rebels.  
The number of participants rehabilitated and reintegrated into the 
Burundian civilian society to date exceeds 28,000. However, program officials 
were unable to meet their initial reintegration timetables, and this process 
continues even now. The overall program structure places its general emphasis 
on social and economic reintegration. Within this framework, officials have 
sought to implement reintegration and rehabilitation through investment in the 
areas of targeted community-based assistance, opportunities for self-
employment, livelihood projects, and income-generation skills development 
training. Program officials have also generally sought continued education, 
awareness, and support for entrepreneurship and employment promotion in 
terms of monetary and infrastructure facilities assistance. A number of prominent 
organizations have acted as resource benefactors, with aid coming from 
Germany, the World Food Program (WFP), United Nations Operation in Burundi 
(ONUB) and the World Bank (WB). This assistance has been centrally 
coordinated under the entity known as the Multi-country Demobilization and 
Reintegration Program (MDRP), and it has been jointly advocated by the World 
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Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). In 
terms of the rates of failures (recidivism), there have been no reports of former 
rebels returning to ethnicity-based combatant armed units. The strengths of the 
program include the support and coordination from foreign bodies, such as the 
World Bank and other international agencies. Conversely, the weaknesses of the 
program include the lack of efficient resource management and mobilization; the 
poor planning and coordination of competent Burundian authorities; and the 
political instability, corruption, and bias at governmental bureaucratic level. 
The civil war and the consequent problem of terrorism in Burundi proved 
to be disastrous for the country’s economic, political and social development. The 
aftermath of the civil war and terrorism undermined economic development 
activities. Consequently, it continues to affect the improvement of the quality of 
life for the poorer segments of Burundi society, which in turn acts as an essential 
pre-requisite for the growing radicalization in the region. 
Burundi is a clear example of a country facing extreme poverty in a 
context of fragility, after decades of ethnic and political rivalries. In order to 
capitalize on and continue the development efforts of the past, it is necessary to 
consolidate the peace process and to assist Burundi in achieving future stability. 
This consolidation is important not only for Burundi, but for the entire region and 
its various border issues as well. The harmful effects of terrorism are particularly 
severe in countries and regions which are in conflict and which have weak 
governance systems and fragile economic stability. Therefore, strengthening of 
the capacity building measures to include institutional building in post-conflict 
scenarios to combat terrorism is a crucial component of any comprehensive 
development strategy that includes its reintegration processes too. 
B. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM IN BURUNDI 
Civil conflict in Burundi started in mid-1960, after it gained independence 
from colonial powers. Since then, armed conflict between Tutsis, Hutus, and 
other ethnic based breakaway groups have erupted in Burundi from time to time, 
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with conflicts recorded in 1965, 1972, 1988, and 1991. The most recent hostilities 
began two years later in 1993, when Melchior Ndadaye (a Hutu), the first 
democratically elected president in Burundi, was assassinated. The last conflict 
in Burundi continued over a period of nine long years; however, this most recent 
civil war in Burundi finally came to an official end in 2005, when Pierre 
Nkurunziza elected as the President.93  Rebel groups in Burundi ultimately 
reached a ceasefire agreement in 2008, and it has generally remained in effect 
ever since. 
The Burundian reintegration program started from the end of 2004 and 
was implemented under the patronage of the National Commission for 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). Following the start of 
the program in 2004, an initial 16,000 rebels and soldiers underwent the 
reintegration process. By 2008, that number increased to some 25,000 ex-
combatants who had been reportedly reintegrated into the Burundian civilian 
society. Although there have been no statistics found in terms of recidivism 
(returning to the ethnic based combatant armed branches), there have been 
some reported incidents of violence among the ex-combatants in Bujumbura.94 
Disturbed by a series of internal conflicts, the reintegration process of Burundi is 
slow in coming and has not been completed. According to official reports, even 
as of now in 2012, some 38,500 Burundian returnees have yet to be 
reintegrated.95 
Supported by foreign aid and international diplomacy, Burundi has still 
been able to achieve significant progress since the end of the war. The country 
has held free and transparent elections since 2005. In 2008-2009 the last active 
rebel group, the National Liberation Front-NLF (Front de la Liberation Nationale), 
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also known as the FLN, laid down their arms. Despite all of the pressures 
imposed by the authorities, the press and civil society in Burundi continued to 
play their democratic role. The division between Hutus and Tutsis is no longer 
seen as the leading cause of all evil in Burundi, and the army is no longer an 
instrument used by one ethnic group to protect its privileges. In sum, 
considerable progress has been made.  
Of course, significant challenges do remain, as was made evident during 
the 2010 elections. The main opposition parties decided to withdraw their 
candidates for presidential and legislative elections in June and July 2010, 
denouncing what they termed as rigged elections.96 In the elections that took 
place in May, the immediate consequence of this withdrawal was a landslide 
victory of the ruling party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-
Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). Since then, there have been 
increasing political tensions and violence spreading throughout the country, as 
illustrated by numerous incidents of intimidation and murders of an extrajudicial 
and political nature. The attack on September 18 in Gatumba, in which 36 people 
lost their lives, has revived painful memories of the massacres before the 2005 
elections. The civil and political liberties that were gradually acquired have been 
recently damaged by the state services which proceed by intimidation, 
summonses, untimely questioning, and even imprisonment of members of civil 
society, human rights workers, journalists, lawyers, activists, anti-corruption 
observers, and others. In early 2011, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, expressed concern about the “return of a climate of 
impunity” through intimidation, torture, arrests of members of the opposition, and 
extrajudicial executions. Thus, while Burundi has made progress, there are still 
fresh concerns about whether the country will slip back into old patterns. 
Despite these setbacks, though, the country continues to move forward. 
As a positive development, it should be noted that the Burundian government 
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has recently confirmed its commitment going forward in setting up mechanisms 
for transitional justice and a Truth and Justice Commission in 2012. As of May 
2011, it had already installed the Independent National Commission for Human 
Rights (INCHR also known as CNIDH), led by activists of civil society who have 
distinguished themselves in defending human rights, although the Commission 
has not yet received sufficient means of operation. In short, Burundi has made 
significant progress towards peace, but the page of the conflict is not yet turned 
over and loyal support of the external partners are crucial. 
As per the head of the National Commission for Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), the peace efforts in Burundi were 
also characterized by an "in stages" approach.97 The Civil War is a Burundian 
ethnic conflict which broke out in Burundi on October 21, 1993, following a coup 
against Ndadaye. As the genocide took place in Rwanda in 1994, it was marked 
by the contrast between Hutus and Tutsis and extended over the decade in 
neighboring countries. Although hostilities largely ended in the 2000s, the 
sporadic violence still strains the peace agreement of 2005. 
C. THE ACTION PLAN OF THE BURUNDIAN REINTEGRATION 
PROCESS 
There has been a commitment to live up to the 2000 peace agreement. 
This commitment has been particularly apparent among the political parties, 
whereas most of the insurgent groups—but not all—did not sign this agreement 
until three years later. The coexistence of the old Burundian armed forces and 
ex-combatants from former rebels, the Forces for the Defense of Democracy 
(FDD) is undoubtedly the main pillar of the new climate of peace in Burundi.98 
Balances and quotas agreed to at the time of the signing of the Arusha Peace 
Agreement (August 2000) and the ceasefire between the Government and the 
National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of 
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Democracy (CNDD-FDD) in November 2003 have had an indisputable stabilizing 
effect.  Officials sought the application of ethnic parity in the army and the police 
while simultaneously trying to avoid a sudden standstill caused by precipitate 
action. The DDR (Disarmament, De-mobilization and Reintegration) process was 
formally launched in December 2004 with the aim of the demobilizing 85,000 
fighters by 2008. By June 2005, approximately 10,000 men had been 
demobilized.  
Officials had expected that at least some of the latest non-signatory 
countries would agree to demobilize following the election victory in August 2005; 
however, this was not the case.99 The plan for the demobilization of some 3,387 
military personnel in March and June 2008, almost all of whom were Tutsis—
including more than half of Tutsi officials—raised serious protests. The end of 
civil war and the absence of large-scale political violence forced hundreds of 
thousands of refugees and displaced persons to return home.  Because of this, it 
became necessary for the Burundian government to intervene and help resolve 
land disputes, as they were inevitably linked to the abrupt changes that had 
taken place.100 
In Burundi, the reintegration of former combatants was initiated at the end 
of 2004. The program of reintegration in Burundi was sponsored by the multi-
country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP). The World Bank 
assumed supervision of the MDRP on behalf of the countries that were sending 
their donations for the program. In Burundi, the country’s president Nkurunziza 
founded the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (NCDDR).  In turn, the NCDDR also established the office of 
Executive Secretariat, the occupant of which would be designated to assume 
administrative control of the program. To this date, the Executive Secretariat (ES) 
has been operating under the direction of General Silas Ntigurirwa, the Executive 
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Secretary.101 The ES has two divisions, namely the division for demobilization 
and the unit for reintegration.   The ES also has the responsibility of the national 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program. 
1. The implementation of the Burundian Reintegration Process 
The main results and shortcomings of the Burundian reintegration 
program are that the MDRP demobilized around 26,000 ex-combatants and 
rebels. The DDR program in Burundi had different phases and during the first 
phase of its initiation, the program aimed at reintegrating some 16,000 ex-
combatants into the civilian society.  Nonetheless, when the second phase of the 
political process of the country began, wherein power of the government was 
overtaken by the Hutu parties, the program of reintegration of the ex-combatants 
was hampered and a number of ex-combatants, both soldiers and the police, 
were not successfully reintegrated into the society. Throughout the process of 
demobilization in the region, the imbalance of ethnicity in the army remained a 
sensitive issue. Though the army had been responsible for ensuring peace in the 
post-conflict era in Burundi, the negotiations carried out by the National 
Liberation Front (NLF) in 2008 threatened the stability of the region, with the 
issue of re-integrating troops into the civilian society.  A large number of 
members from the former force, the Burundian Armed Force (the old Tutsi-
dominated army, also called FAB), had not been demobilized for a long time.102 
The National Commission for DDR set up regional offices for the purpose 
of ensuring smooth reintegration of the former combatants.103 This office had 
different levels, and at the first level of the office, the volunteers, called the focal 
points, were promised to receive a stipend for monitoring the on-field activities of 
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the ex-combatants. However, a 15-month delay in the start of the program from 
June 2005 to September 2006 caused complications and severely weakened the 
entire concept of the Burundian reintegration. One major problem was the proper 
disbursement of funds, as a total $41.8 (USD) million appropriated for the 
Burundian reintegration program by the MDRP was not fully utilized in the 
program—only $20 million was actually disbursed. The main focus of the 
reintegration program was the reintegration of individual ex-combatants into the 
civilian society and it had nothing to do with involving the host community.  Since 
there were a huge number of ex-combatants and rebels of the former national 
army who had an urgent need to be reintegrated into the society, the government 
of Burundi gave preference to an individual approach, and it appropriated around 
$600 per person (equal to 600,000 Burundian Francs) for the purpose of 
reintegration. 
The Burundian government was compelled to observe the planning of the 
Arusha Peace Agreement, according to which the army had to be balanced in 
terms of the ethnicity of the members (50% Tutsi and 50% Hutu). The process of 
reintegration was divided into two parts, which consisted of a transitory period of 
18 months, during which the ex-combatants were provided quarters and given 
their salaries. This phase was followed by a reintegration flight, in which the ex-
combatants were given a five-option reintegration package to choose from. The 
five options included the following:104 
• Re-employment 
• Reception of skills development/vocational training 
• Reception of entrepreneurial support, training and funds for  
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• Reception of an income generating support by participating in 
certain activities (Income Generating Activities Support-IGAS) to 
start a self-employment opportunity, cash for public work programs 
and livelihood support etc; and 
• Reception of formal school education 
The majority of the ex-combatants, around 25,000 of them opted for the 
AGR, but the process had been very lengthy which led to a one-year gap 
between the process of demobilization and reintegration into the society.105 The 
process of reintegration did not initiate until September 2006 and, by this time, a 
huge majority of ex-combatants had already been waiting for their reintegration. 
In the initial stages, the civilian organizations had shown some reluctance to get 
involved in the program, but as the entire procedure of the DDR remained 
politically influenced, they moved in. During the first phase of the DDR process, 
some NGOs were selected to implement the process of integration. The National 
Commission for DDR provided a list of ex-combatants with badge numbers so 
that the agencies involved could easily trace the ex-combatants.106 
2. The Outcome of the Burundian Reintegration Process 
The Burundi reintegration did not succeed because of various reasons. 
For instance, according to an estimate, some 19,000 ex-combatants belonging to 
National Liberation Front were still left to be reintegrated in to the civilian society. 
The Burundian government entered into an agreement with the South African 
government and the NLF agreed to integrate some 2,500 rebels into the police 
force and the national army.  The problem is worse in the rural areas of 
Bujumbura, where displacements are repetitive.  Some of the armed groups in 
the region have not yet signed the ceasefire agreement and the DDR process for 
the ex-combatants is taking place slowly.  
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However, there is an urgent need for the integration of ex-combatants into the 
national army, as it is one of the more important precautions to counter 
radicalization and to prevent any future conflict.107 
A typical reintegration flight for the income generating activities support 
(IGAS) was based on a proposal that invited the ex-combatants to opt for their 
reintegration package. The process was lengthy as the reintegration trajectory 
was passed onto the NCDDR office for an approval before the program began. 
Once the initial process was complete, the involved NGOs gave basic skills 
training to the ex-combatants which included writing receipts, stock-keeping, 
client dealing skills, and other forms of training. For this purpose, the NGO would 
first get approval from the NCDDR offices and collect the required material from 
them and then proceed. Many of the ex-combatants were indignant about the 
fact that the money was not given to them and start-up kit materials were 
provided instead. The main problem area was the coordination between the 
implementing agencies and the national mechanism (the NCDDR offices).  The 
National commission was supposed to ensure that the project had local 
ownership; however, it turned out that the NCDDR was incapable of handling the 
program. Problem areas such as the lack of local ownership, the lack of political 
stability, and the time-consuming ill-planning and mismanagement of the entire 
program contributed to the failure of the reintegration program in Burundi.108 
As for the reintegration in the urban areas in Burundi, the reintegration 
failed miserably; it did not take place because the target population to be 
integrated lacked the skills to successfully reintegrate into the civilian society.  
The ex-combatants had joined the army when they were young, and most of 
them had dropped out of school.  Another faction of the ex-combatants was the 
members of the ex-FAB army, who had been highly dependent on the money 
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they received under the reintegration program. Those ex-combatants who 
decided to opt for the income generating activities support (IGAS) package 
lacked the skills and were proved incompetent with small existing traders and 
they did not have access to wholesale traders or credited facilities.109  
The reintegration process became a one-off dose of resources in a 
societal context where the post-war conflict had led to serious deprivation for the 
people. As for the reintegration in the rural areas, it was slightly more successful 
as compared to the urban reintegration. This is due to the fact that these ex-
combatants were able to return to their former livelihood and started working on 
their lands with their families, which enabled them to more easily reintegrate into 
their communities.  This group of ex-combatants was in a position to buy a small 
land with some cattle and therefore had an income boost. As for other groups of 
ex-combatants, especially those who had been in exile for more than 25 years 
had lost family contacts and land and they were compelled to start a livelihood 
from a scratch.  Moreover, as for the other groups who opted for the income 
generating activities support package, the rural areas had to face similar 
problems which their urban counterparts had to face. Since the cost of living in 
the rural areas was comparatively low, the people in rural areas could subsist for 
a little longer on the reintegration package before becoming destitute once 
again.110  
According to the 2007 data collected by Gillian, Mvukiyehe and Samii 
(2010), the World Bank program for the reintegration of the ex-combatants after 
the Burundian civil war led to significant economic reintegration; however, this 
economic reintegration failed to lead to greater social and political reintegration. 
The survey found that the reintegration program in Burundi provided a 
considerable boost in the income of the ex-combatants, which resulted in a 20-
35% reduction in the incidence of poverty among the ex-combatants. There also 
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have been moderate improvements in the prospects of livelihood of the ex-
combatants. However, these economical effects did not translate into political 
integration in Burundi. Further, there is no strong evidence to prove that the 
Burundian program led to a satisfactory peace process or a more positive 
tendency towards the functions of the good governance that essentially 
eliminates the opportunities for growing radicalism. The reintegration programs 
are central in ensuring permanent peace in the troubled entity and to meet the 
desired objectives, provided that considerable resources are committed to them. 
The social and political integration turned out to be a failure in the Burundian 
reintegration process because, unlike the economic reintegration process that 
targets individuals to economically assist them, it was not possible in case of 
social and political integration. 111 
3. Summary of the Burundian Reintegration Process 
The Burundian reintegration failed because of various reasons like the 
lack of resources, the corrupt practices of the governmental officials, and 
mismanagement on the part of the authorities. The reintegration program offered 
lengthy processes, and participants had to go through many painstaking steps 
before choosing the ‘right’ reintegration package for themselves. Also, the main 
reason for the failure was lack of coordination between the implementing 
agencies and the national mechanism (the NCDDR offices and the NGOs). In the 
Burundian reintegration case, the plan failed because of a variety of reasons. 
Burundi is a poor African country and it could not mobilize its resources on the 
same level as Saudi Arabia did. There was political corruption prevalent in the 
country and the reintegration plan, which was largely supported by foreign 
agencies, was not properly handled by the local authorities. Since there was an 
acute dearth of proper planning and lack of monetary and other resources, the 
Burundian government could not handle the huge chunk of population of ex-
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combatants and could not successfully reintegrate them into civilian life. Those 
who were reintegrated had to live a life of unemployment and poverty, which 
forced them to reconsider their decision of enrolling themselves into the 
reintegration plan. The biggest reason was political corruption, which led to the 
failure of Burundian reintegration program. 
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IV. THE YEMENI REINTEGRATION PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Yemeni reintegration program started in September 2002. The 
authority that implemented the Yemeni Reintegration Process was the Yemeni 
Committee for Dialogue and this program was launched by the Yemeni 
government, under the leadership of Judge Hamoud al-Hitar. 
In terms of its organizational structure, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh summoned five senior clerics who formed the nucleus of this initiating 
endeavor. The committee expanded to 24 members, under the purview of four 
relevant ministries.  The number of participants rehabilitated and reintegrated so 
far is nearly 400. The program was in progress until 2005, when it came to a halt 
because of pressures from political parties in Yemen who had never been in 
favor of the program from the outset. Therefore, the program could not be fully 
developed, as per its initial schedule.  
In terms of the specifics of the program structure, it includes the art of 
dialogue itself, topics for dialogue, and guidance on sharing of information to the 
relevant authorities. In terms of the specifics of the implementation of the 
program, it includes building trust of the leadership in the government and the 
committee; effective interaction among the detainees and the intelligence cadres; 
and the eagerness of the detainees to search for truth and to seek equal 
treatments from the dialogue participants. The program’s human resources are 
comprised of 24 main members and 58 other clerics. The Yemeni government 
says that 4% are engaged in terrorist activity. The strengths of the program 
include the firm conviction of the founders of the committees of the dialogue 
program, which was weakened by internal political pressures in the country. 
Concerning the weaknesses of the program, the biggest hurdle, as 
aforementioned, was the pressure from political parties. 
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Radical and extremist Islamism has been one of the most talked-about 
phenomena since the attacks of 9/11. Despite the ongoing war on terror, and 
despite the fact that most nations of the world condemn terrorism, most of the 
interventions designed to counter Islamist terrorism focus on limiting the actions 
of the extremists. Rather, they should be focusing on rectifying the terrorist 
ideologies that compel the extremist mindset to carry out violent actions. In 2002, 
observers saw changes in the way Yemen dealt with the terrorist elements in the 
country. Since the 9/11 attacks, there had been 116 Yemenis detained at the 
Guantanamo Bay Prison in Cuba on charges of being involved in the 9/11 
attacks and belonging to the chapter of al-Qaeda’s Yemeni terrorist 
organization.112 The Yemeni state decided to initiate a project to negotiate with 
the returnees from the Guantanamo Bay Prison, including some who were 
identified as hardcore terrorists. The Yemeni government planned to convert the 
radical militants to a give up on their extremist ideology and resort to a moderate 
and peaceful understanding and comprehension of Islam.  The Yemeni 
government established the Committee for Dialogue, as previously noted, to hold 
dialogues with the detainees, grounded on common acknowledgment of Islamic 
laws and Islam as the eventual source of legitimacy and truth. Between 2002 and 
2005, some 364 Yemenis underwent the de-radicalization program and were 
reintegrated to civilian lives. The government claimed at the time that the 
graduates of the program had sworn allegiance to change their radical beliefs, 
and had decided to renounce violent extremism and lead a peaceful life.  
The approach of the Yemeni pattern of de-radicalization and reintegration 
had been similar to that of Saudi Arabia, but there were major differences in 
terms of results. Although the Yemeni dialogue process received an initial 
endorsement from the international community and the leader of the program, 
Judge Hamoud al-Hitar, had been repeatedly invited to present his views on 
counterterrorism at various international workshops and seminars, the Yemeni-
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sponsored program ultimately failed. As a result, the Yemeni dialogue project 
was stopped in 2005, when it was discovered that two of the graduates had 
recidivated to terrorism and were involved in fighting against the United States-
led NATO forces in Iraq.  The incident of recidivism gravely sabotaged the 
dialogue program and the claims of the program were subjected to overwhelming 
suspicion.  Moreover, some of the detainees released after graduating from the 
much-publicized program had expressed that they did not, in reality, change their 
ideology and that they had not genuinely exchanged in a dialogue.113 Adding fuel 
to the fire, the Yemeni government had witnessed a fresh wave of violent attacks, 
carried out by the former detainees. Thus, the Yemeni dialogue program ended 
in failure, and the views of the terrorists (with their radicalized ideology) were 
hardly changed. 
B. BACKGROUND OF THE YEMEN PROBLEM 
In Yemen, the problem of Islamic extremism was triggered as an outcome 
of a long and intricate history. In the 1980s, a large number of Yemeni citizens 
had enthusiastically participated in the jihad against the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. These people were thoroughly prepared to wage war against the 
‘Soviet infidels’ and were radicalized accordingly. When the Afghan war was 
over, the Yemeni government called its citizens back home to reintegrate them 
into civilian life. The Yemeni government also allowed the foreign veteran 
soldiers to settle in Yemen.114 Many of these Arab Afghans were appointed by 
the Yemeni regime then and were given a chance to work for the state-owned 
security organization in Yemen.115 This kind of co-optation was also used for 
Yemeni detainees after the attacks of 9/11. In 1993, the Department of State of 
the United States declassified information about Yemen that the country was fast 
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turning into an important stop for many of the ex-combatants who fought in 
Afghanistan.116 According to the report, the Yemen government was either 
unable to control the activities of the militants or the Yemen government was not 
willing to curb the growing militancy in the country. The regime used Islamism 
throughout the 80s and 90s against domestic opponents, and during the civil war 
that erupted in Yemen in 1994, the Islamists battled against the forces in the 
south. Owing to internal disputes, the Islamists were also alleged to have fought 
against the southern and northwestern separatists as well.117 After some deadly 
attacks that were carried out in the year 2002, including the attacks on the 
French oil tanker Limburg and the United States Ship-Cole (USS-Cole), there 
was a brief temporary calm in Yemen. During the relative calm between the 
extremists and the Yemen government, the United States increased its pressure 
on the Yemen government to develop a long-term counterterrorism strategy.  
However, after several years of a short-lived calm, young Yemeni insurgents 
emerged. This new wave of insurgents rejected a dialogue with the Yemeni 
government, considering the government to be illegitimate and its members as 
traitors for being supportive of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which was a 
key foreign policy objective of the United States. This young faction of rebels was 
further trained and energized by dangerous prison escapees. These young 
terrorists took the country on a rampage and launched a new violent campaign 
against tourists, foreign residents, oil facilities, and government security 
targets.118 
Yemen was one of the first to launch a de-radicalization program following 
the return of jihadists who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the 
late 1980s. Upon returning to their homeland, jihadists represented a great 
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destabilizing factor due to the radical extremist views they had adopted while in 
Afghanistan. Disengagement in the Yemeni de-radicalization program included 
apprehending returnees from Afghanistan as well as other potentially violent 
extremists 
In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the process of 
de-radicalization had an almost cosmetic character to it. Terrorism was 
confronted with various degrees of effectiveness on a military level, but it did little 
to undermine the ideological appeal of the terrorists. While the dominant idea at 
the time was that the capture of terrorists would remove the threat of further 
attacks, over time, policy makers began to realize that this approach could only 
be so effective until it was coupled with programs to address the ideological 
underpinnings that foment and foster violence. The use of force alone could not 
wipe out the threat of terrorism so long as its radical ideology remained intact. 
With extremist jihadist ideologies, militants seek to inspire new generations of 
terrorists to perpetuate the terrorism cycle. Moreover, al Qaeda in Yemen has 
become an increasingly decentralized and loose organization held together by 
strong ideological bonds. What is more, even the capture and imprisonment of 
terrorists and their supporters gave rise to another concern, which is that these 
prisoners could be further radicalized or recruit more supporters while in a prison 
environment. In light of this concern, it is worth noting that before its closure, half 
of the remaining detainees in the Guantanamo Bay Prison were Yemeni citizens.  
More than forty of these former inmates were released into the custody of 
the Yemeni government.  As soon as the United States government decided to 
send the Guantanamo Bay Prison detainees of Yemen origin back to their home 
country, the Yemeni government decided to establish a Yemeni rehabilitation and 
reintegration program for these Guantanamo returnees.  The Yemenis agreed in 
principle to the establishment of a reintegration and rehabilitation centre for the 
Guantanamo detainees as a risk reduction initiative and to contain growing 
Islamic radicalism and terrorism in the region.  Therefore, when the Yemeni 
government realized that something had to be done about the violent ideology 
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that many Yemenis were rapidly adopting and the international pressure that 
Yemen had been receiving to counter terrorism, the Yemeni government initiated 
a dialogue committee to counsel, de-radicalize and reintegrate the terrorist 
detainees.119 The aim of the plan was to rectify the extremist ideology of the 
terrorists and not merely to hold them in prison.  
C. THE PROPOSED PROGRAM OF THE YEMENI REINTEGRATION 
PROCESS 
After the attacks of 9/11, a large number of Yemeni nationals were 
arrested by the Yemeni government on the suspicion of being involved in the 
attacks. Those detainees were accused of carrying out bombings on the USS 
Cole, as well as other terrorist activities. Most of the detainees had also been 
involved in the Afghan war against Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 
Others had associations with the terrorists. As the Yemeni government was 
pressured to release the detainees, Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh 
deliberated the legal means of releasing some of the individuals who had not 
broken any laws of the land. Therefore, the Yemen government launched its 
dialogue program.  This program was indented to make sure that the detainees 
would not revert to terrorist activities upon their release from custody.  Ironically, 
President Saleh, who greatly relied on jihadists in 1990s, was set to announce 
the establishment of a dialogue committee on August 24, 2002, during a 
conference of Yemen’s ruling General People’s Congress.120 Eventually, the 
president convened over a private meeting with some of the country’s renowned 
senior religious leaders; they had a detailed discussion on the establishment of 
the dialogue program to de-radicalize and reintegrate the detainees into civilian 
life. In September 2002, the dialogue committee met with the detainees for the 
first time. The committee included Judge Hamoud al-Hitar, three other sheikhs, 
and five detainees. The detainees questioned the credibility of the ulemas by 
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asking if they were legitimate clerics and charging that had they been righteous 
Islamic scholars, they would not have allowed the detainees to be in imprisoned. 
The detainees accused the committee members of being government’s stooges.  
In reply, al- Hitar accepted that the ulemas in Yemen had not been doing their job 
in a proper manner and that they were instructed to hold a meaningful dialogue. 
The detainees were made aware that the dialogue was an all-or-nothing attempt 
by the Yemen government and that the detainees were also given a chance to 
convince the ulemas of their stance, if they thought they were right—and vice 
versa. The detainees were given two options: direct or indirect dialogue. In the 
direct dialogue, the detainees had to engage in an oral, back-and-forth 
discussion, while the indirect dialogue would be written, thus requiring a longer 
period of time.  
The detainees chose direct dialogue.121 The detainees were presented 
with an agenda, including the established rules for the dialogue and the topics to 
be discussed. The rules stressed mutual respect of opinion.122 After the dialogue, 
some 364 detainees were released. These detainees were from different 
backgrounds and were representing many different organizations. The 
participants were between 18 and 40 years of age. According to the statement of 
the Yemeni government, 90% of the program participants were not born in 
Yemen; rather, they were born outside to Yemeni parents in countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The detainees were required to sign a 
document declaring their renunciation of terrorist activities. Further, after the 
release, the detainees were on a compulsory probation period of one year.  
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The family and tribal members of the detainees had to vouch for the detainees 
upon release to monitor their activities carefully. Some of the released individuals 
were reported to have died in the Yemeni attacks and in Iraq.123 
The government of Yemen decided to ask the international community to 
fund the program and the government agreed to monitor the program locally. The 
program first sought the amelioration of the terrorists, but more than that, it also 
sought to confront the fast-spreading radicalized mindset that was posing a risk 
not only for Yemeni society, but for the entire world as well.  The program was 
designed to help the detainee terrorists in Guantanamo Bay to return home, 
enter the rehabilitation program, and become reintegrated into the society as 
normal, civilian citizens leading productive lives.  As the detainees from other 
regions of the world continued to leave the Guantanamo Bay Prison for their 
homes, the remaining 75% of the detainees left in the Prison were Yemeni 
citizens. The detainees who were involved in the Yemeni dialogue project were, 
in general, not hardcore terrorists like the LTTE terrorists in Sri Lanka, and were 
not among the more prominent ideologues of Islamist movements.124 According 
to some human rights activists, some of the detainees were detained because 
they merely belonged to the family of hardcore terrorists, being used as a bait to 
compel the terrorists to hand themselves over to the authorities.125 
The United States government decided that indefinite detention of the 
terrorists was not a solution to contain terrorism. The Yemeni government agreed 
to rehabilitate terror suspects and subsequently to reintegrate them into the 
society.  
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The United States government decided to support the Yemeni government in the 
endeavor, as the United States government itself was inclined to prevent the 
terror suspects from returning to terrorist activities once the United States 
government decided to close the Guantanamo Bay Prison and contain the 
militant fold from proliferating.   
A psychological factor often identified in disengagement process is the 
detachment from the ideology of the organization. In the Yemeni case, the 
successes of the psychological aspect of the disengagement process resulted in 
some participants being influenced enough to change their rhetoric, and it 
inspired others not to participate in criminal actions. Some minimal effort was 
also made to provide employment to the former prisoners. However, due to 
scarce resources, Yemen was not proactive in setting up aftercare programs to 
rehabilitate detainees into mainstream society, nor did the government provide 
social support or other services to detainees upon their release as the Saudi 
Arabian reintegration program did. Similarly, no surveillance mechanism was put 
in place to monitor detainees after their release, allowing for a greater likelihood 
of recidivism. The program did not track recidivism rates regularly among 
released detainees.126 
In terms of the application of de-radicalization factors, Yemen’s central 
approach was heavily religious, using clerics to debate with prisoners about their 
understanding of Islam, and it tried to impose its will on rehabilitees. The 
exchange between detainees and clerics (often one cleric for three to seven 
detainees) occurred both within prison and outside of prison, creating an 
environment more conducive to building mutual trust and respect. The debate 
revolved around the legitimacy of jihad and its correct interpretation according to 
the Qur’an. It is significant to note that clerics found that the most zealous 
terrorists who had fought in Afghanistan were more challenging to engage with in 
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terms of creating an open dialogue. This is a critical point that will be common to 
all programs analyzed, which suggests that de-radicalization programs, as 
currently designed, fail somehow to appropriately address hardened terrorists.  
1. The Implementation of the Yemen Reintegration Process 
As per the original plan, the Yemen and the United States had agreed to 
establish a center in Sana’a for the rehabilitation of returning Yemenis from 
Guantanamo Bay Prison, with funding from the United States government. The 
center was to include a program that would coordinate the preparation of 
technical workshops that would facilitate professional and academic training. 
These programs were intended to allow for the reintegration of returnees in 
Yemeni society, and to provide them with the skills needed to participate in 
community development programs, and to ultimately correct their path of thought 
from wrong to right. Yemen’s rehabilitation center was to be based on a 
foundation of providing adequate intellectual and cultural rehabilitation and 
psychological support to the returnees, with the United States administration 
financing the establishment of the center and the processing of various other 
related installations.127 Officials in Sana’a submitted this rehabilitation program 
plan to the United States, and Washington accepted the proposals, a set of 
developments, which contributed to a gradual overcoming of differences about 
how to address the fate of Yemeni detainees in Guantanamo. The government’s 
plan of building the terrorist rehabilitation center with an estimated $11 million 
grant from the United States was made with the understanding that the terrorist 
rehabilitation center would house Yemeni detainees coming from the 
Guantanamo Bay Prison. 
When discussing the implementation of the dialogue project, several goals 
were mentioned, including those of the founder of the program, Judge al-Hitar. 
He said the goal of the project was facilitating the release and reintegration of the 
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detainees into the civilian society. According to al-Hitar, the project was based on 
the perception that “ideas can be fought back by ideas.” Therefore, conviction-
oriented negotiation is the best way to solve problems that are based on an 
ideology.  The project was promoted by the Yemeni president, who said the 
Yemeni government intends to challenge the extremist beliefs and ideology of 
the detainees by making them interact with moderates, instead of desolating the 
suspects behind bars.  
The Al-Hitar-led Dialogue Committee continually focused and laid 
emphasis on the essentiality of acceptance and mutual respect between the 
detainees and the dialogue participants in order to ascertain the conditions 
necessary for the existence of a fruitful dialogue. According to the founder, the 
dialogue was a success and he mentioned that the detainees had been 
successfully convinced that their ideologies were deviant from the Yemeni state 
interpretation of Islam.128 This depicts that the extremist element in the country 
was due to an ideological assumption and that only counter ideas can be used to 
counter terrorist ideology. However, the designated timing of the program 
indicated that the reasons behind the terrorist actions were more than just their 
own radical ideas; in fact, the Yemeni state had previously promoted jihadist 
Islamism.   
The dialogue was conducted in three phases. The first phase was based 
on surveillance that included the intellectual flow of ideas and the implementation 
of security. The second phase included the establishment of human development 
training, with the intention of reintegrating them into the society over the long 
term. In the third phase, the Yemeni government decided to take the initiative of 
providing employment opportunities and helping returnees to address the 
everyday problems that they were enduring, along with their families and other 
affected parties. The program proposed that all the dialogues would be 
substantiated in the light of the Qur’an and Sunnah (based on fundamentals of 
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the Islamic law), as well as opinions of authenticated Islamic scholars. The 
participants of the dialogue program had been given a lot of time to research and 
develop a thought-provoking process.  
The dialogue had three important factors: the art of dialogue, topics within 
this dialogue, and the sharing of developmental know-how among the relevant 
authorities.129 The committee functioned intimately with the infrastructure of 
Yemeni security forces in organizing channels of information gathering and 
sharing in their battle against radical ideology. The Dialogue Committee 
accorded that their chief sources for the negotiation are the Holy Qur’an and the 
Sunnah.  
2. The Outcome 
The de-radicalization programs vary from country to country depending on 
the preference and political context of the state concerned; some are nascent 
while others are mature and well developed. Typically, a religious cleric engages 
the inmate in a religious debate but some states favor repentant terrorists. In the 
case of Yemen, no aftercare programs or surveillance mechanisms were put in 
place to monitor fresh graduates, thereby raising the question and even the 
likelihood of recidivism. In contrast, successful reintegration models focused on 
mechanisms that were in place. These included the incorporation of families, 
tribes, and the security apparatus into the program, and developing a relationship 
with program staff who remain involved in the life of the released graduates, to 
help reduce the chance that they will return to terrorist activity. 
As the Yemeni government lacked financial support and an integrated 
plan for supporting the de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of 
terrorists, the Yemeni DDR process failed primarily because the Yemeni 
government tried to impose its own terms on the detainees, though it was trying 
                                            
129 “ICPVTR Visit To Yemen (2010), Combating Terrorism In Yemen Through The 
Committee For Religious Dialogue,” The International Centre For Political Violence and Terrorism 
Research and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 
5–8.  
 75 
to portray their efforts as a success.  In order for the Yemeni dialogue to 
succeed, there was a need for the government to understand the aforementioned 
three-point head to evaluate the strategy properly and to determine its 
usefulness. Further, the United States and the Yemeni governmental strategy did 
not confirm its success fully in spite of the large number of confrontations and 
battles with groups that are described as extremist such as al-Qaeda and 
affiliated groups in various countries around the world. As observers have 
repeatedly noted, the goal of the strategy is not only the fight against extremism 
and terrorism, but to prevent extremist groups to allow its growth.  
Perhaps the most prominent cause of extremism is the general sense of 
injustice among radicals, whether it is real or merely perceived. With respect to 
the general radicalism that prevailed in Yemen, the United States’ reputation was 
marred among the Yemeni people with its continued operation of prisons, 
especially Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prisons, along with its continuous 
occupation in the Middle East, which increased the hostility of the young toward 
United States of America. This also has gravely affected the changing of mindset 
of Yemeni-based radicals and weakened the program.  
As far as the necessity of a good understanding of extremist ideology is 
concerned, both the causes and desires of preventing the tendency towards 
extremism and terrorism are needed in building successful reintegration 
programs for the returning extremists. In this context, the providing of transitional 
services designed to release the detainees and after-release care was not 
properly met by the Yemeni ex-combatants. Educating the former Yemeni 
terrorists on Islamic teaching based values was successfully met by the program; 
however, the requirement of converting these understandings into behavioral 
changes among the radicals, which is one of the pre-requisites of successful 
reintegration, was hardly satisfied.130 
                                            
130 Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan (ed.) (2009), Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and 
Collective Disengagement, New York: Routledge, 181–192. 
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Enhancing the capacity building required in attracting ex-rebels into a 
moderate state-supported process needs opening of political mainstream into to 
a greater societal dialogue among them.131 This aspect was not seen its desired 
respect in the Yemen reintegration process. Moreover, the Yemeni program had 
to deal with constrained resources. As for the Yemen reintegration case, the 
Yemeni government initially planned to carry out a reintegration plan for the 
terrorists along the same lines as those which were later carried out by Saudi 
Arabia; however, Yemen failed to carry out a successful reintegration program for 
the terrorists like the latter did in year 2004 because it lacked financial resources 
and, as a result, it could not plan and design a strong rehabilitation facility, the 
way that other countries did. Moreover, the country was politically unstable, and 
because of deeply rooted political corruption in the governmental hierarchy, the 
plan was almost destined not to be successful in Yemen. Most importantly, unlike 
in Saudi Arabia, Yemen did not try to employ a comprehensive soft strategy for 
its terrorists. Instead, they tried to impose their will on the detainees which, 
instead of bringing the terrorists toward positivity, made them rebel even more. 
Owing to this, the recidivism rate in Yemen was high. Furthermore, the Yemen 
example also failed because, unlike Saudi Arabia, there was no strong tribal 
system in Yemen, and terrorists took advantage of the mountainous terrains of 
the region to build their hideouts and the terrain turned out to be a safe haven for 
the terrorists which were not the case of Saudi Arabian reintegration process.  
These were some of the core reasons why the reintegration process in Yemen 
failed to succeed. 
3. Summary 
One of the biggest challenges that the Yemeni government faced in terms 
of the Dialogue project appears to have been because of the lack of genuineness 
of the committee and the position that it exemplified. One of the underlying 
defects observed in the Yemen reintegration program was with the structure of 
                                            
131 Jillian Schwedler (2006), Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3–7. 
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the program, which never aspired to authentically employ mutual dialogue but to 
construct a proposal for the state’s monologue, which was to be used to convert 
and persuade the detainees who had “incorrect views.” According to al-Hitar, the 
head of the Dialogue Committee, the dialogue was meant to be based on mutual 
respect of opinion. In other words, the dialogists and the detainees were to have 
an equal position, and they were to be permitted involvement in a genuine 
exchange of opinions and ideas, and try to work with each other. However, in 
practice, this did not happen; there was no such equality, because the detainees 
were still at the mercy of the securities and were not fully free to express 
themselves. Under these circumstances, the probability of a genuine negotiation 
and mutual exchange of ideas was sabotaged from the outset.   
The Yemeni state was directing a particular result from the dialogue, 
wherein the detainees would understand and accept a certain moderate 
interpretation of Islam. However, this was in contrary to the original spirit of the 
dialogue, which was based on the principle that “if you are right we will follow you 
and if we are right you must follow us.”132 Therefore, this rhetoric paved the way 
for the likelihood of failure in achieving the desired outcome from the dialogue 
project. However, the government could not accept the failure of not being able 
to convert the terrorists; therefore, the Yemen Dialogue never intended to allow 
mutual respect and free flow of opinion from the detainees. Instead, it was 
continuously encapsulated in a wide-ranging plan for hard security procedures 
that would provide more protection more tangibly. 
Therefore, the dialogue approach that was promoted by the government 
on the surface was not implemented by the government in the truest sense of the 
word. Rather, the negotiation concept was co-accepted into a wide-ranging 
strategy of repressing activities. The inclusion of the Yemeni dialogue not only 
failed to genuinely convert the detainees, but also contributed to the division and 
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weakening of the entire Yemen counterterrorism plan and we can witness its 
outcome even today. This was because of a lack of credibility, internal political 
pressures, and a lack of follow-up programs that led to recidivism.  As a result, 
the program in Yemen ended in December 2005, considered a failure due to 
graduates returning to violence after their release. From the Yemeni case, it is 
apparent that a sustained effort by the state to track and influence detainees both 
inside and outside of prison is needed; otherwise, former detainees may rapidly 




Since the 1990s, disarmament, demobilization, and re-integration (DDR) 
has been considered a crucial phase in the transition from conflict to peace. One 
of the pre-requisites for post-conflict stability is the re-integration process of 
former combatants. Re-integration is a somewhat general term that is generally 
associated with rehabilitation. In the context of national and global security, the 
term “re-integration” typically refers to the process by which governments plan 
and orchestrate efforts to neutralize insurgents, and gradually implement a series 
of efforts and programs to assist them in their transition from insurgency to 
civilian life while minimizing recidivism.  
As this research has documented, the examples of re-integration in Saudi 
Arabia, Burundi, and Yemen have provided counter-insurgency stakeholders with 
examples of both successes and failures in the global effort to transform militants 
into productive civilians. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia was able to provide the 
world an example of a mostly successful re-integration process. Conversely, the 
examples of Burundi and Yemen remind counter-insurgency observers and 
stakeholders how challenging the process of re-integration can be; officials in 
these societies have not been as successful in convincing militants to give up 
their arms. In this section, the author revisits these examples to explain why the 
Saudi re-integration process succeeded, and why similar programs in Burundi 
and Yemen did not. The discussion continues by proposing benchmarks and 
lessons learned from these aforementioned examples, and revisiting the 
hypotheses mentioned from the outset. Lastly, the author concludes by applying 
these lessons to the process taking place in Sri Lanka. 
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B. LESSONS LEARNED AND APPLYING THEM TO SRI LANKA  
1. Comparing Successful and Unsuccessful Re-integration 
Efforts 
a. Why Saudi Arabia’s Re-integration Effort Succeeded 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provided the world with a model of 
successful re-integration, and its efforts succeeded for several reasons. The 
foremost of these is the fact that in its move to transform hardcore terrorists, the 
Saudi regime and interior ministry officials carefully planned and implemented a 
soft strategy. The Saudi government did not have to rely on foreign monetary 
assistance in order to carry out its re-integration program. Rather, their program 
was funded domestically, and the government saw to it that their support was 
more than adequate and that it was well utilized. For the purpose of the program, 
the Saudi Arabian state used their resources to implement a soft strategy 
wherein religious scholars, foreign-trained psychologists, and counterterrorism 
experts were hired to design a successful plan to rehabilitate the terrorists.  
Under the PRAC strategy (prevention, rehabilitation, and after-release care) of 
Saudi Arabia, the government built well-equipped and well-facilitated 
rehabilitation centers for the returning detainees of the Guantanamo Bay Prison. 
Former militants were given religious lectures that directed them toward a 
conventional interpretation of Islam over the more extremist elements. Under the 
program, the detainees were not only exposed to motivational discourse, they 
were also given opportunities to learn new skills and take part in athletics and 
other recreational activities, which proved to be healthy for their emotional and 
overall wellbeing. Further, the wealthy Saudi government granted monetary help 
to the families of the detainees who, in return, extended maximum support to the 
government in order to prevent recidivism. Last but no less important, the Saudi 
approach emphasized negotiations and a somewhat open dialogue between the 
ex-combatants and the government. These were the major reasons that the 
Saudi case was successful.  
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It is true that Saudi Arabia benefited from its inherent advantages. 
Saudi Arabia is a nation that is rich in natural resources and the wealth they 
generate. The Kingdom also benefited from the fact that it was able to 
concentrate its efforts on a relatively small group of hardcore radicals who were 
not necessarily regarded as much of a direct threat to the regime as they were to 
Western nations, particularly the United States. Even so, the government of 
Saudi Arabia recognized these advantages and capitalized on them. They saw to 
it that their rehabilitation programs were well planned, well coordinated, and well 
funded, all in an attempt to counter the spread of extremist ideology. In doing so, 
Saudi Arabia set an example for other countries to follow in terms of re-
integration and de-radicalization efforts. 
b. Why Re-integration in Burundi and Yemen Failed 
As the Burundian example illustrated, the process of re-integration 
is fraught with challenges. The obstacles to re-integration of militants are 
particularly high when a country lacks the sort of inherent advantages that are 
enjoyed by Saudi Arabia and other resource-rich nations. Burundi is a poor 
African country and, therefore, it could not mobilize resources to the same level 
as Saudi Arabia did. Moreover, the problem of limited resources was 
compounded by the huge problem of political corruption, which undermined its 
program’s initial successes. Thus, the re-integration plan, which was largely 
supported by foreign agencies, was not administered properly by the local 
authorities. Consequently, the lack of monetary and other resources, the acute 
dearth of competent administrative planning, and the political corruption all acted 
together against the re-integration process; the Burundian government could not 
handle the huge population of ex-combatants and, therefore, could not 
successfully re-integrate them into civilian life. Those who were re-integrated 
returned to a life of poverty and faced a lack of employment, which forced them 
to reconsider their decision to enroll themselves into the re-integration plan. 
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The re-integration process in Yemen was similarly doomed by a 
combination of economic and political problems. The national government there 
initially planned to carry out a re-integration plan with much novelty for the 
rehabilitating terrorists under their program (similar to what Saudi Arabia carried 
out later, in 2004), but it too failed to carry out a successful re-integration 
program for these former terrorists. As was the case with Burundi, Yemen lacked 
adequate financial resources and, therefore, Yemeni officials could not plan and 
design a rehabilitation facility as Saudi Arabia did. Another similarity with Burundi 
was that Yemen was politically unstable and suffered from deeply rooted political 
corruption within the governmental hierarchy, which meant that their plan 
struggled to find success from the start. Yemen’s program also failed, however, 
due to reasons that were unique to the situation in that country. Another problem 
they had, for example, was that whereas Saudi Arabia had largely succeeded 
due to its use of soft power, the Yemeni leadership tried to impose their will on 
the detainees. The Yemen government did not seem interested in negotiating 
and hearing the grievances of the detained combatants, and the government 
quickly lost credibility in the eyes of militants there. As a result, instead of 
bringing the terrorists more in line with the government’s position, they typically 
resisted cooperation even more. Owing to this, the recidivism rate in Yemen was 
high. 
Moreover, despite sharing borders and some common cultural 
aspects with Saudi Arabia, Yemen found it difficult to replicate the Kingdom’s 
success for two additional reasons. Firstly, whereas Saudi Arabia was able to 
make use of its strong familial-based tribal systems to resolve issues, no such 
system existed in Yemen. A second problem for Yemen was that geography 
made security difficult, as terrorists took advantage of the mountainous terrain of 
the region to build their hideouts and safe havens, which was not easy to do in 
the case of Saudi Arabia.  Ultimately, Yemen failed to capitalize on the United 
States assistance to its re-integration process to the optimum. These were some 
of the core reasons why the re-integration process in Yemen failed to succeed.  
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C. RE-INTEGRATION BENCHMARKS AND BEST PRACTICES 
As the previous section illustrates, although we do not necessarily have a 
perfect model for re-integration, we do have real-world examples of successful 
and unsuccessful processes to draw from. We can therefore tentatively begin to 
establish benchmarks and best practices for the re-integration process, wherever 
it may take place. Using the examples discussed in this paper, observers can 
gain a better understanding of both the factors that characterize effective re-
integration programs, as well as the forces that may contribute to the failure of 
these systems. In sum, the lessons learned from these examples can be applied 
to other areas of conflict going forward.  
As hypothesized in the beginning of this paper, benchmarks and 
standards of the re-integration process do, in fact, exist; we have seen that when 
applied, they can greatly increase the chances for extended periods of peace 
and internal stability, as this paper has discussed in reference to Saudi Arabia. 
The re-integration program in that country serves as a strong model for other 
national governments around the world. The Saudi example demonstrates that 
when national economic resources are appropriated in adequate amounts and 
administered responsibly, militants may feel more enticed (at least initially) to 
give up armed resistance.  
This paper secondly proposed that competent planning and 
implementation are essential to the process of re-integration, and that efforts be 
largely devoted to the use of governmental soft power that address quality of life 
issues of the rehabilitating militants. Conceptualizing a program is not enough; 
governments must plan thoroughly and allocate sufficient financial resources to 
address the large numbers of ex-combatants who will need immediate 
assistance. The government should see to it that these programs adequately 
support correctional staff, counselors, and other transitional team members so 
that they are properly equipped and trained to help ex-combatants back into 
society. Accordingly, transitional program counselors should teach ex- 
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combatants how to begin a new life and should endow them with essential life 
skills such as education, financial management, and how to develop their 
livelihood.  
In addition to these broad areas, transitional programs should also focus 
on daily essentials. These include taking steps such as helping former militants in 
obtaining identification documents, social beneficiary tokens, and vocational skill 
certificates, so that they will have the confidence of furthering their education and 
obtaining employment. Transitional programs should similarly focus on improving 
the quality of life for ex-combatants, such as access to health facilities, as well as 
other facilities that may promote their literary, educational, economic, social, and 
even their spiritual development. The Saudi case makes it clear that when these 
steps are taken, the results can be effective. Saudi Arabia committed vast 
financial resources to the cause of re-integrating former al-Qaeda militants, and 
its interior ministry ably administered their transitional programs, with a broad 
focus on improving their quality of life. Burundi and Yemen, on the other hand, 
exemplify the potential consequences when states fail to consider these steps. 
Both countries had only limited resources; beyond these limitations, however, it is 
clear that poor implementation in both countries was largely to blame for the 
failure of their respective programs. In short, embracing a re-integration program 
is not a guarantee that re-integration will work; planning and administration of 
programs must also be effective in order for such efforts to be successful.  
A third prediction made in this paper was that a complete re-integration 
process can indeed help former militants develop stronger bonds and ties to their 
communities, thereby making it easier for them to reintegrate within their 
societies. The evidence in this paper seems to document that this prediction is 
largely true. On the one hand, it is true that ex-combatants face many economic, 
social, and emotional challenges upon their reentry into society.  They face 
obstacles such as finding lost family members, land disputes in their ancestral 
territories, safe and affordable housing, unmet educational and employment 
needs, undiagnosed past memories, and family reunification issues. It is, 
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therefore, necessary for re-integration programs to include economic, social, and 
emotional needs of a satisfactory magnitude so that they can break the cycle of 
recidivism. Fortunately, as the example of Saudi Arabia demonstrates, a 
complete program of re-integration can go far in alleviating the pressures that ex-
combatants face. The rate of recidivism has been low in the Kingdom because 
the Saudi government provided for the economic, social, educational, and other 
individual needs of the ex-combatants who were returned to society.  
D. APPLYING THE EXAMPLES OF SAUDI ARABIA, BURUNDI, AND 
YEMEN TO SRI LANKA 
1. Overview of Sri Lanka’s Re-integration Efforts to Date 
The ongoing re-integration in Sri Lanka began in May 2009. Despite the 
comparative lack of resources, the Sri Lankan government has enjoyed 
successes in re-integrating former combatants of LTTE. It began the mammoth 
task by accepting some 11,000 ex-LTTE militants into its re-integration process; 
present records indicate that fewer than 1,000 of these former combatants 
remaining in the rehabilitation centers.  
During the remaining phase of the program, officials should be careful not 
to repeat the mistakes made by Burundi and Yemen. The case of Saudi Arabia 
differs from that of Sri Lanka in that Sri Lankan officials have fewer financial and 
other resources at their disposal. However, as discussed, money alone was not 
the sole reason the Saudi re-integration process succeeded, nor was the lack of 
money the only reason that Burundi and Yemen failed. The Saudi Arabian re-
integration strategy was not only well funded but also well planned and 
implemented, and the government made considerable attempts to address the 
larger quality-of-life issues, which Burundi and Yemen largely failed to address. 
Accordingly, during the remaining phases of its re-integration program, Sri Lanka 
would probably be well advised to consider what it can take from the experiences 
of these countries and adapt them to suit its own context.  
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2. Limitations of Applying the Saudi Example to the Sri Lankan 
Context  
As tempting as it might be to advocate using the Saudi strategy, it may not 
be possible. To begin with, it is fair to say that the soft strategy used by Saudi 
Arabia is difficult to implement in a country like Sri Lanka for more than one 
reason. This clearly depicts that every country has to design a unique strategy for 
re-integration, considering its own social and cultural structure of the society. 
One strategy that works fine in another country may not necessarily be 
successful in another country.  
One major difference that complicates any analogy between Saudi Arabia 
and Sri Lanka lies in the nature of the insurgencies in each country. In Saudi 
Arabia, for instance, the majority of the people who underwent rehabilitation were 
low-level threats to security, chiefly those who used to raise funds for jihad.133 
Moreover, although there may have been intentions by some of the al-Qaeda 
operatives to attack the Saudi regime, much of their attention seems to have 
been diverted to targets outside of the Kingdom. These people did not face much 
difficulty re-integrating into the society, and Saudi Arabia generally experienced 
far less trouble in the re-integration militants.  
By contrast, Sri Lanka has recently emerged from a long, tragic, and 
savage armed conflict in which thousands of innocent civilians lost their lives. As 
a result, Sri Lanka faced enormous political, cultural, and commercial 
disintegration, as well as massive destruction to property.  In spite of the several 
efforts taken by consecutive governments in the country, the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) proved inexorable in their aim to establish a separate state 
in the North and East parts of the country for the Tamil population there. In its 
effort to do so, the LTTE waged a violent separatist insurgency against the 
government and people of Sri Lanka, and they additionally took hostages and 
deprived them of their basic human rights as well. In response, the Sri Lankan 
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government launched and sustained a bloody counterinsurgency campaign 
against the LTTE to liberate the citizens who were held hostage by the LTTE. 
The campaign against the LTTE was successfully completed in May 2009, 
following the demise of LTTE’s high command and consequently, the surrender 
of the remaining cells of the LTTE.134 When comparing the re-integration 
processes of Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka, the differences in terms of the 
domestic objectives of the insurgents and the intensity of the confrontations in 
these countries make clear the need for caution in using the Saudi Arabian case 
as a benchmark and basis for expectations in Sri Lanka. In fact, Sri Lanka’s 
situation mirrors that of re-integrating the ex-combatants in Burundi. As in the 
Burundi conflicts, many of these former LTTE combatants had lived their entire 
lives during the course of war, and the LTTE had even made attempts at child 
conscription. Since the end of the conflict, the Sri Lankan government has been 
left with the responsibility of re-integrating many former LTTE combatants back 
into their communities. Thus, it is clear that duration and brutality of the conflict in 
Sri Lanka obviously makes re-integration a more complicated process than it was 
for militants in Saudi Arabia.   
Complicating these efforts, a second difference that this paper documents 
repeatedly is that there are economic differences to consider. Saudi Arabia is a 
resource-rich country, and it offered financial assistance to the ex-combatants, 
which turned out to be a huge motivating factor. The Kingdom helped the 
detainees by providing material support to them after their release, thus 
contributing to the re-integration into society. The precursors of this strategy 
suggest a high degree of success, as it was able to re-integrate some of the 
detainees in the community. By contrast, Sri Lanka is a third-world developing 
country that cannot rely solely on this type of strategy; it has limited resources. In  
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sum, whereas the Saudi Arabian government is very rich and can afford to help 
the detainees financially; such facilities and resources are not available to the Sri 
Lankan government. 
3. A Path to Future Success   
Despite the formidable challenges, Sri Lanka is making a strong effort to 
avoid the mistakes of its counterparts in Burundi and Yemen, and it is making an 
earnest effort to reintegrate the former LTTE combatants in the society. Although 
it lacks the resources available to Saudi Arabia, the Sri Lankan process of re-
integration appears to be more successful than those in Burundi and Yemen. 
Recall that the Burundian authorities greatly lacked the expertise, planning, and 
commitment to carry out the re-integration process. Yemeni officials had planned 
to develop facilities and institutions to rehabilitate extremist militants, but failed 
because of similar problems, and also due to a failure to establish trust with 
these radical factions. Results in Sri Lanka, though, suggest that the 
government’s progress is comparatively further along in terms of re-integrating 
the former LTTE combatants into society. A recent report revealed that out of 
some 1,800 children reported missing and recruited by the LTTE during the civil 
war; almost 600 have since been found and are reunited with their families.135 
Further, reports last year revealed that the Sri Lankan government had planned 
to release more than 1,800 ex-combatants, after helping them to enroll into and 
successfully complete their rehabilitation program in September 2011. According 
to the same report, some 1,717 male members of LTTE and some 99 female ex-
combatants were reintegrated into the civilian society at a state ceremony held at 
Temple Trees, the official residence of the Sri Lankan President.136  
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In less than three years, Sri Lanka has set an example for the world in terms of 
re-integration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants by helping the re-integration of 
nearly 12,000 former LTTE cadres, which is commendable.137 
E. IN CLOSING 
Multiple countries worldwide are forced to deal with civil conflicts and 
answer questions about how to deal with ex-combatants. A longstanding 
controversy is over the role that economic and social re-integration plays in an 
ex-offender's propensity to return to arms. This controversy has recently 
assumed new importance after the 9/11 attacks in United States. The immediacy 
of this issue has forced not only the victimized nations but also others to 
contribute in countering the radical ideologies that culminated in the types of 
attacks seen on September 11. Therefore, the nation states are taking extreme 
measures to fight the ideologies that propagate extremism around the globe. 
Policy makers in various terror-hit countries of the world are attempting to halt the 
recidivism cycle, primarily by building new prisons and developing facilities. The 
motivation behind this solution is the belief that incarceration is an effective 
deterrent to further extremist activity. However, overreliance on this and other 
methods that seek containment of political extremists have largely failed; 
undoubtedly, the failure of this strategy stems from the fact that building new 
facilities addresses only the symptoms, rather than the root causes of the 
problem. 
A much less used alternative strategy for breaking the recidivism cycle is 
to re-integrate ex-offenders into the community by providing them with a range of 
programs designed either to increase their ability to obtain a job or to actually 
place them in a job.  This approach is based on the assumption that employment 
is a viable alternative to crime—so much so that employed prison returnees will 
be less likely to recidivate. However, evaluations of these employment-oriented 
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programs have found them to be rather ineffective in reducing recidivism as well. 
Thus, an extensive debate continues over the efficacy of using this approach to 
prevent ex-combatants from being re-incarcerated, particularly in light of the fact 
that funding for such programs is usually quite limited.  
Even in light of the results, these employment programs still receive 
support from observers. Those who favor this strategy acknowledge, on one 
hand, that employment alone is not a sufficient deterrent to the issue, and that 
there is little reason to expect a program exclusively oriented towards 
employment to reduce recidivism. Rather, they view employment as only one of 
many forms of assistance that ex-combatants need upon their release, and it is 
only by addressing all such needs that recidivism will be reduced. Indeed, the 
example of Saudi Arabia shows that success probably comes as a result of a 
multi-faceted approach. It is imperative for policy makers to have an 
understanding of the fundamental reasons why individuals recidivate either by 
committing again or by violating the terms of their probation or parole. 
Furthermore, because a great deal of the literature points to economic status as 
an important factor in involvement in terrorism, an understanding of the 
association between employment and recidivism is crucial. It is also important to 
identify factors other than employment that may affect recidivism, such as family 
and friendship relationships, ability to access community services, educational 
background, and other unlawful means of dependency. 
Ultimately, Sri Lanka will adopt its own approach to dealing with questions 
about long-term stability and how best to re-integrate ex-combatants into their 
society. The government there has examples that can be helpful. Even if the Sri 
Lankan government cannot copy the Saudi example exactly, it can still learn from 
its successes. Moreover, it can use the lessons of failed re-integration in Burundi 
and Yemen to avoid similar errors. Sri Lanka’s best strategy is to reintroduce 
former LTTE combatants into society and to re-integrate them more fully through 
counseling, job training, and education programs. Fortunately, Sri Lanka’s re-
integration process is already well underway and on the right track, with a group 
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of 1,000 former LTTE cadres having been re-integrated into society in 
September138 and another group of 350 ex-combatants in October of last year.139 
Interestingly, only 931 ex-LTTE cadres remain to be reunited with their families; 
this marks the completion of the Sri Lankan re-integration process, before the 
end of this year (2012).140 All of these are positive developments and evidence 
of how far Sri Lanka has come within the past three years. 
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